别等我 – 写给错过的爱恋和祖国

2014/01/23

别等我

- 写给错过的爱恋和祖国

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楼顶的旭日,正午的光

太阳西斜

燃烧着大西洋

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春季的疑惑,夏的奔放

秋日殷实

点缀苍凉的忧伤

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我会在深冬的暗夜启航

纹身太阳图腾,带着春的想像

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着红戴绿, 穿粉配银

碎花多彩的裙子,

    高跟鞋,打上蝴蝶结

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你矫情南边的烟火

我闷骚北边的烟火

还有酒吧的窗子,赖皮框住的烟火

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我迟了,但我终将到达

一把无弦的吉他

一脸沟壑纵横

不过你千万别等我

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大风吹过、雨打过

你玩过,我浪过

伤寒疟疾胡言乱语过

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我在东港捕我的龙

你在西街吃你的烧烤

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纹身太阳图腾

带着春的想像

谁敢拦我就给他一枪

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我们厮守过、虔诚过

我们爱恋过,患得患失过

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我迟了,但我终将到达

一袋过期的烟草

一面浑浊的旗帜

不过你一定别等我


许志永法庭陈词:最后为了自由·公义·爱 For Freedom, Justice and Love — My Closing Statement to the Court by Xu Zhiyong

2014/01/21

许志永2014年1月22日在庭审被法官打断的最后陈词:“把公民的权利当真,那些写在《世界人权宣言》和中国宪法里的选举权、言论自由、信仰自由等神圣的权利不能永远是一张白条;把公民的责任当真,中国是我们每个人的中国,良心正义的底线在我们每个人的脚下,需要我们每个人去坚守……”

为了自由·公义·爱-我的法庭陈词
作者:许志永
新公民运动授权发表

你们指控我在推动教育平权,随迁子女就地高考和呼吁官员财产公示的行动中扰乱公共秩序,表面看这是一个公民言论自由与公共场所秩序的边界问题,实际上,这是你们是否把公民的宪法权利当真的问题。而更深层次的问题是,你们心中深深的恐惧。恐惧公开审理,公民自由旁听,恐惧我的名字出现在互联网上,恐惧一个正在到来的自由社会。你们试图打压新公民运动,阻碍中国和平改良的民主宪政之路。虽然你们在庭审中没有提及新公民运动,但是,案件材料中大量涉及,我想,没有必要回避这个问题,敞开来谈,对中国社会进步是有意义的。

新公民运动倡导每个中国人堂堂正正做公民,把公民的身份当真,我们是公民,是国家的主人,不是臣民,顺民,草民,暴民;把公民的权利当真,那些写在《世界人权宣言》和中国宪法里的选举权、言论自由、信仰自由等神圣的权利不能永远是一张白条;把公民的责任当真,中国是我们每个人的中国,良心正义的底线在我们每个人的脚下,需要我们每个人去坚守;新公民运动倡导自由、公义、爱的新公民精神。个人自由,无拘无束真实快乐的自我是国家和社会的永恒目的;公义是个人自由的边界,是此世间的公平正义,是恒久的道义良心;爱,是友善,是宽容,是同情,是奉献,是人世间最美好的情感,是幸福的源泉。

自由,公义,爱是我们的核心价值,我们的行动指南。新公民运动倡导每个公民从自身做起,从身边做起,从小事做起,从改变具体的公共政策和制度做起,理性建设性推动国家民主法治进程,追求民主法治公平正义的中国人在共同的公民身份下团结起来,在自由民主的规则之上形成公民的共同体,成长为公民社会健康理性的力量。公民群体有共同的公民身份,共同的民主宪政理念,共同的自由,公义,爱的信仰。但公民群体不是专制意义上的组织,没有领导,没有层级,没有命令与服从,没有纪律与惩罚,而是完全基于自愿的自由公民的联合。各地公民群体在推动具体的制度变革行动中自发的自主成长。公民群体作为公权力的监督者,政治改革的推动者,民主法治的建设者,在推动社会进步的行动中健康成长。推动教育平权,随迁子女就地高考和呼吁官员财产公示就是在这一理念下的公民行动。

推动教育平权,实现随迁子女就地高考是我们2009年底开始的一项为期三年的行动。在那之前,我们陆续接到一些家长的求助,注意到这样一个严重的社会问题,中国两亿多新移民在城市工作,生活,作为纳税人却不能平等地享有市民待遇,而其中尤为严重的问题是,他们的孩子不能在他们身边学习和参加高考,不得不被送到数千里之外的户籍地读书,由此制造了中国数千万的留守儿童。很多人关心留守儿童的命运,却未曾想过,对他们最好的帮助是打破户籍隔离的高墙,让他们回到父母身边。

我们的行动分为三个阶段,第一阶段,2010年初到当年6月,到北京市教委和海淀教委请愿,协商推动了北京中学升初中不分户籍的平等入学。第二阶段,2010年7月到2012年8月,到教育部请愿,推动教育部出台随迁子女就地高考政策。第三阶段,2012年9月至年底,敦促北京市教委落实教育部的新政策,我们通过征集签名,扩大家长志愿者团队,每月最后一个周四到教育部门请愿,提交建议,召集专家研讨随迁子女就地高考可行性方案,给数以千计的人大代表写信、打电话和见面,恳请他们在两会期间提出议案。2011年两会期间,教育部长接受采访时说随迁子女就地高考方案正在制定中,2012年两会期间,教育部长在媒体面前公开承诺,随迁子女就地高考政策将在上半年内出台,并要求各地在年底前出台具体实施办法。

2012年6月28日,和以往一样,是家长志愿者的例行请愿日,和以往一样他们没有得到教育部门的任何答复,大家在现场约定,如果教育部不能按承诺在月底前出台新政策,他们在下周四还来,这就是7.5请愿的由来。2012年8月,教育部终于公布了随迁子女就地高考政策,并要求各地在年底前出台具体实施方案。到2012年年底,全国共29个省市陆续出台了随迁子女就地高考方案,但是北京却成了例外。一位家长苦笑着说,我们奋斗了三年,解放了全中国,却唯独剩下了自己。

我知道这背后是眼泪,他们的孩子即将远离父母,到陌生的地方去读书,也许命运会从此改变。作为理想主义者,我们推动全国大部分地区实现了随迁子女就地高考,但是,作为这个新政策的主要推动者,北京的非京籍家长却没有给他们的孩子们争取到公平的机会。我觉得很对不起大家,而这时很多人已经开始心灰意冷,我不得不去地铁口发放卡片,号召大家2.28请假一天,到北京市教委门口请愿,作最后努力,这就是2.28请愿的由来。7.5和2.228请愿,我们去的是教育部门,是公民到国家机关表达诉求,我们去的不是法律意义上的公共场所。刑法对公共场所界定得很清楚,是除国家机关、社会单位、公共道路之外的公共空间,所以我们的行为不构成扰乱公共场所秩序。

三年来,我们的行为一直温和理性,7.5的时候,确实有个别家长情绪激动,那是因为教育部没有兑现自己的公开承诺,也没有给予任何的解释。但是即使这样,他们的所谓激动也就是喊几句口号,他们要求与教育部长对话,也是合理的,因为他们拿着十万人的签名,背后是两亿新移民的权利,然而他们却遭到了什么呢?看看现场的照片吧,那个网名叫跳舞的家长,被警方拎着头发抬走。难道就没有别的办法把她带走吗?她做了什么过激的行为吗?三年来她有任何的过激行为吗?没有,从来没有!每当我想起这一幕就痛心不已,三年来我们的目标如此单纯,我们的行为如此温和,却遭到如此恶毒的对待。有警察拿着事先拟定好的名单,恶意地殴打他们。但是即使如此,我还是一再告诫他们,要理性,要理性,一定要理性。我们不能和他们一样,这个社会需要新的希望,我们不能和他们一样。

教育平权,随迁子女就地高考,符合新公民运动的理念,从具体的公共政策和制度改变做起,为迁徙自由,为公义,为爱。1958年中国确立了户籍隔离制度,从此城乡分隔为两个世界。1961年,中国确立了收容遣送制度,从此,一个农村人,如果想自主到城市寻找工作和新生活的希望,他随时会被抓捕遣返。2012年一年时间,北京抓捕遣返22万人次。

2003年,收容遣送制度废除了,但新移民融入城市的道路依然漫长。2006年,我们在北京调研时发现,针对非户籍常住居民的歧视政策多达19种,而其中最不人道的,就是孩子不能在父母身边上学。我们为了推动随迁子女就地高考,整整努力了三年。三年间,我见证了教育公平志愿者们严寒酷暑中在地铁口、在路旁、在商场,征集签名支持,直到有联系方式的签名支持者超过十万人。我见证了几百位家长在教育部信访室的后院集体朗诵《教育平权宣言》,我见证了数百位家长和孩子到青龙湖公园植树,那是2012年清明节,大家的帽子上有统一的标识―在北京,爱北京。我见证了凤凰卫视一虎一席谈录制现场,一位小女孩失声痛哭,因为她不想离开在北京工作的爸爸妈妈,到陌生的户籍地读书。我见证了地安门外的一个胡同里,国子监中学初三的学生章旭东,这个班级前十名的学生,因为没有北京户籍,被迫到初中毕业后不得不到张家口一人完全陌生的县中学读书,一年后因为语言、环境、教材不适应等原因失学了。这个爱说爱笑的孩子从此变得沉默寡言。他的父母在北京工作了近三十年,而他们却永远是外地人,是这个城市的贱民。

想到千千万万被万恶的户籍隔离制度永远改变命运的孩子,想到一代又一代被万恶的户籍隔离制度伤害的中国人,想到那些无以计数的死在收容遣送路上的中国人,为消除中国特色的身份隔离制度,为中国数千万留守儿童争取在父母身边上学的权利,今天我站在被告席上,何止是无怨无悔,我是多么的骄傲啊。

呼吁官员财产公示,是我们推动国家反腐败制度建设的努力。全世界超过137个国家和地区建立了官员财产公示制度,为什么中国就不能?“人民公仆”到底害怕什么呢?不要太贪婪,不义的财富带给自己的不只是奢华的生活,同时还是深深的恐惧不安,以及来自民众的愤怒与仇视。我们用征集签名上网,发放宣传品,以及上街打条幅等方式呼吁官员财产公示,同时也是践行宪法规定的公民言论自由权,我们的行为没有侵害任何他人的正当权利,没有任何的社会危害性,即便西单演讲个别言词有激烈之处,但是,作为针对公共政策的言论表达,也没有超出宪法和法律规定的言论自由界限。

公民在公共场所以打条幅、演讲等方式公开表达政治观点,在现代文明社会,完全属于正常的社会现象。执法机关可以在现场监督和防范,但不应该滥用权利,不当干预。事实上,我们在清华西门,中关村广场等地打条幅,在没有警察在场的情况下,也没有出现任何的秩序混乱,没有妨碍其他任何人的权利,大家打完条幅就离开了。这符合我们一贯“快闪”的理念,我们没有用如今多人聚集的方式进行公共表达,采取少数人快闪方式表达,就是考虑到了中国国情,考虑到了中国社会的承受能力。我们当然希望宪法中规定的那些神圣权力都变成现实,但是,改革需要稳定,社会进步需要渐进地进行,作为负责任的公民,我们要采取点滴方式践行宪法规定的权利,推动国家民主法治进程。

十年来,为自由,为公义,为爱,为我们一直以来的梦想,我们一贯用和平改良的方式来推动国家和社会的进步,我们通过介入公共事件来改变具体的制度和公共政策。2003年,孙志刚以他生命的代价废除了收容遣送制度,在此过程中,作为法律人,我们尽了自己的努力,以公民的名义对收容遣送制度提出违宪审查的建议。最近十年我们继续努力,争取新移民融入所在城市获得平等的权利,一直到2012年推动随迁子女实现就地高考政策的出台。我们为遭受极端不公的受害者提供法律援助,这其中有三聚氰胺奶粉受害者,动车事故受害者等等。

2008年,三鹿事件暴发后,我们组建律师团,根据媒体报导,计算受害者数量。根据法律提出公正的赔偿方案,联合受害者共同推动了政府主导的赔偿方案的出台。但政府赔偿方案远不能弥补很多孩子受到的伤害,比如,一个孩子的手术费用花了将近十万,而赔偿只有三万元。接下来我们继续为委托我们的四百多个孩子寻求公正,起诉到最高法院,起诉到一百多个地方法院,起诉到香港法院。2009年7月,当我被以公盟偷税的名义投入监所,社会各界为公盟捐款缴纳罚款的时刻,我们的志愿者在南方,正在把其中一笔一百万元送到受害的结石宝宝家中。我永远为那个时刻感到骄傲,我们不会因为自己身陷困境就放弃对弱者的承诺。

很多个冬天,我们给贫穷的露宿街头的上访者送去棉衣、棉被、馒头,以尽量避免他们在这个繁华的都市里悄无声息地冻死、饿死。上访中国特色的维权,这是一个关系社会,关系背后是特权、腐败、不公正,只有少数性格倔强的人才敢站出来捍卫自己的权利和尊严,但就是这少数人,聚焦到国家的首都就是成千上万。他们在北京被驱逐,被非法拘禁,被殴打。我们核实过的,非法拘禁他们的黑监狱,北京就有四十多处。我们去现场围观,拿着法律条文举报正在进行的犯罪,遭到看守的辱骂殴打,一次又一次,我为能够分担他们的一点点痛苦而感到骄傲。

十年了,因为选择站在无权无势者一边,我们见证了太多的不公不义,太多的苦难不幸,可我们依然怀着一颗光明的心,理性建设性推动国家进步。在对收容遣送制度提出违宪审查建议后,我们调研起草新的流浪乞讨人员管理办法,推动教育平权,我们起草的随迁子女就地高考方案,被大部分省市所接受。呼吁官员财产公示,就在2013年3月我们还曾经讨论起草阳光法案。提出问题就要找到解决问题的办法,反对,是为了建设,因为我们是新时代的公民,对国家负责任的公民,我们爱中国。

然而遗憾的是,你们把公民群体的存在和成长当成异端心怀恐惧,你们说我们有政治目的,是的,我们的政治目的很清楚,那就是民主、法治、自由、公义、爱的美好中国。我们追求的,不是为打江山坐江山,为权力不择手段的野蛮政治,而是美好政治,是为公众谋取福利的美好事业,是全体公民共同治理国家的事业,我们的使命不是为了获得权力,而是为了约束权力。为中华民族世世代代的公平正义自由幸福建设民主法治健全的现代文明制度,奠基高贵的政治文明传统。美好政治离不开真正的民主法治,各级政府与议会必须由人民选举产生,政权出自选票而不是枪杆子。真正的民主法治,政治在法治秩序中运行,政党公平竞争,只有在自由公正的选举中胜出,才有资格执政。真正的民主法治,国家权力科学分立相互制衡,司法独立,法官忠于法律和良心。真正的民主法治,军队、警察是国家公器,不可沦为任何政党和利益集团的私产。真正的民主法治,媒体是社会公器,不可为任何政党和利益集团垄断为喉舌。真正的民主法治,宪法规定的选举权、言论自由、信仰自由等公民神圣的权利必须兑现,人民当家作主的承诺决不是一句谎言。这些现代民主的价值和尺度根植于普遍的人性,不是东方或者西方的,不是社会主义或者资本主义的,而是普适全人类,只要是人的社会,无一例外。民主制度是解决人类问题的知识,我们的祖先没有发现这种知识,我们就应该谦卑,向别人学习。三十多年来,中国引进自由竞争的市场经济制度,带来了经济繁荣,同样,必须引进自由竞争的民主宪政制度,才能解决当前面临的社会不公问题。

当下的中国,社会不公问题激化,而政治权利的不公既是最大的社会不公,同时也是其他不公正的根源。一系列重大社会问题的根源就在于,一个特权利益集团垄断了全部国家政治权力和经济命脉,中国的根本问题就是民主宪政问题。年年反腐败,可是六十多年来,腐败愈演愈烈,没有民主选举,没有新闻自由,没有司法独立,绝对的权力不可能打造一个清廉的政府。年年喊民生,可至今仍有数以亿计的人口生活在国际公认的贫困线以下。偏远山区,甚至每月一百元的低保也常常成为贪官污吏们侵吞的对象。权贵与普通民众之间的贫富差距越来越大。人民仇官仇富,根本上是仇视高高在上的垄断特权。就连教育,基础教育,千千万万个家庭也要为孩子上学而奔波愁苦,到处托关系送钱,甚至连上幼儿园都要行贿。这个社会为什么会溃烂至此?

人,是政治的动物,不仅要吃饱穿暖,还要自由,要公正,要参与国家治理。你们说,全国人大是中国的最高权力机关,可又说这个最高权力机关要听党领导。连国家的根本政治制度都是这样一个公开谎言,靠什么建设诚信社会?你们说,司法公正,法院公开审理,然后安排不相干的人占据法庭的旁听席位,连法院都这样的不择手段,人民到哪里去寻找正义的底线?于是,人与人之间到处是冰冷的面具,连老人摔倒要不要扶居然都成为一个持续的热门话题,毒奶粉、黑砖窑,各种恶劣社会问题层出不穷,但他们对此毫不愧疚,他们觉得这社会就这样。中国社会最大的问题是假,而最大的假是国家根本政治制度和意识形态的假,什么是社会主义,你们说得清楚吗?全国人大是最高国家权力机关吗?政治的谎言无底线,十三亿国民都深受其害,猜疑、失望、困惑、愤怒、无奈、抱怨,是很多人的生活常态。是的,政治和我们每个人息息相关,我们不可能远离政治,我们只有努力去改变它。权力必须被关进制度的笼子里,必须改变家天下党天下的专制政治。我真诚地希望,执政者能够顺应人类文明潮流,主动推动政治改革,建设民主宪政的文明政治,以和平改良的方式实现人民当家作主的百年中国梦。

一个多世纪以前,中国错过了和平改良通往民主宪政的道路,二十世纪,中华民族在革命、动荡与苦难中挣扎,民国曾有的市场经济和民主宪政希望昙花一现,极权政治回光返照,在文革中达到登峰造极。文革之后,中国的经济改革走上了一条增量改革的模式,在不触动旧体制及利益的前提下放松社会管制,又通过市场中成长的力量反作用于旧体制,推动改革前进。同样,中国的政治改革也可以没用此模式,在不触动旧体制利益的前提下,放松社会管制,容忍体制外民主力量健康成长,这才是有价值的中国道路。我们建设公民共同体,理性迈出一小步,对国家是负责任的。你们不用恐惧新公民运动,我们是新时代的公民,理念上,彻底告别了敌人、江山、推翻、打倒的专制意识,坚守自由、公义、爱的信仰,行为上彻底告别阴谋、暴力等野蛮模式,以和平改良方式推动社会进步,在阳光下健康成长。公民群体的使命不是作为反对党存在,虽然建立宪政民主,是未来中国实现政治文明的必然趋势。我们的使命,是和中国所有进步人士一道,共同推动中国实现政治文明转型。

新公民运动是民主法治进步的政治革新运动,也是一场政治文化传统重生的文化运动,民主宪政运行需要良好的政治文明土壤,而这土壤就是我们的集体预期和信仰。美好政治必须成为国民的信仰,无底线的野蛮政治必须在每个人的心灵深处永远成为过去。这需要一群优秀的公民勇敢地担当责任,牺牲自我,成为公民的楷模,这也是我们每一个中国人的责任。

这是我的责任。生在这片土地上,对这个国家的爱是不需要理由的,爱中国,就要让她更美好。我选择作为一个和平的改良主义者,继续一个世纪来先辈们未曾完成的使命,倡导绝对非暴力,倡导自由、公义、爱,倡导和平改良的民主宪政之路。我有能力在这个体制中过上优越的生活,但是,任何的特权都会让我感到羞耻。我选择站在无权无势者一边,一起感受北京的冬天街头地下通道的寒冷,一起承受黑监狱的野蛮暴力。上天创造了贫穷富裕、地位差别,不是为了让我们彼此厌弃甚至仇恨,而是为了让我们彼此相爱,我很荣幸有机会和他们一起走在漫长的上访路上。我选择了担当,在我孩子刚出生,家人最需要我的时候,我渴望守候在她们身边,可是很多年来,面对无辜弱者的苦难,我无法控制自己的悲哀,甚至无法保持沉默,我终于相信,审判和炼狱都是命中注定,为自由、公义、爱,为众生幸福,为主的荣耀,这一切苦,我愿意。

这是我们公民群体的责任。在一个遍地屈膝的臣民社会,总要有人率先站起来,总要有人为社会进步面对风险承受代价。我们是率先站起来的中国人,我们更关心祖国的前途和命运,关心民主法治,关心公平正义,关心弱势群体的尊严的幸福。我们更加纯真善良,厌恶阴谋诡计,向往自由简单幸福的生活。我们努力服务社会,帮助需要帮助的人,推动社会进步。我们勇敢担当责任,为理想放弃特权、放弃很多世俗利益,甚至失去自由,我们努力入下自我,不计较个人得失,尊重别人的权利边界,谦卑面对众生。

这是你们法官、检察官的责任。你们有责任忠于法律和良心,坚持社会正义的底线,不要沦为这个官僚体制中卑微的一员,不要践踏法治的尊严。不要说这是顾大局,中国最大的大局不是领导的命令,而是法治的底线,不要说你们是在按照法律的逻辑在给我定罪,不要忘记宪法规定的那些神圣的权利。不要说这只是个饭碗,你们是无辜的,任何人都要对自己的行为负责,任何时候都要忠于自己的良心。在一个延绵千年的人治社会,中国法律人肩负着特殊的使命。我无论作为辩护人,作为陪审员,作为宪法学老师,都努力坚持良心正义的底线,希望你们也是如此。我一直希望中国司法界会有一场良心觉醒运动,希望你们法官能和国外的同行一样受到人们的普遍尊重,希望良心觉醒能从你们开始。

那些躲在幕后观看这次庭审,或者在等待请示汇报的人,这也是你们的责任。不要因为自己是既得利益者就努力维护旧体制,一个不公正的体制下没有人是安全的。你们心中有太多的恐惧,以为政治永远就是刀光剑影血雨腥风,可是我要告诉你们,时代已经改变,新文明时代,人类社会最伟大的力量,不是暴力,而是爱。不要恐惧民主,不要恐惧失去特权,不要恐惧公平竞争,不要恐惧一人正在到来的自由社会。也许你们觉得我的理想太过遥远,太不切实际,但是我相信信仰的力量,相信人类灵魂深处真善美的力量,相信人类文明进步的浩浩荡荡的进步潮流。

这是我们十三亿中国人共同的责任。王朝、政党,都会成为过眼烟云,而中国依然是中国,我们都是中国人,有责任铸就中国美好的未来,中国一定会成为世界上最伟大的国家,有着最发达的科技,最繁荣的经济,最强大的全球范围内捍卫公平正义的能力,最灿烂的引领人类文明进步的文化。但那不可能是专制的中国,那一定是宪政文明实现之后的中国,那一定是民主的中国,法治的中国,自由的中国。请让我们一起思考我们能够为国家做什么,才能实现这个国家美好的未来。这个国家缺少自由,自由需要我们每一个人去争取,这个社会缺少公义,公义需要我们每一个人去捍卫,这个社会缺少爱,爱需要我们每一个人用真情去点燃。让我们一起把公民的身份当真,把公民的权利当真,把公民的责任当真,把公民社会的梦想当真,让我们一起坚守良心正义的底线,任何时候都不要因为上级的命令去作恶,不要因为后面有人推你你就推前面的人。底线,就在你的脚下,底线,在我们每个人的脚下。让我们一起用爱唤醒沉睡的良知,用爱消除心与心的藩篱,用爱建立中华民族高贵的政治文明传统。

推动教育平权,随迁子女就地高考,呼吁官员财产公示,倡导大家堂堂正正做公民,在这荒诞的后极权社会,成了我的三大罪状。如果执政者有一点点诚意把公民的宪法权利当真,我们当然无罪。我们没有扰乱公共秩序的故意,我们是为了推动国家的民主法治。我们没有扰乱公共秩序的行为,我们不过是在践行宪法规定的言论自由。我们没有扰乱公共秩序的后果,没有人的正当权利受到损害。当然,我清楚社会进步总要有人付出代价。我愿意为自由、公义、爱的信仰,为了中国美好的未来承担一切代价。如果你们执意迫害一个民族的良心,我将坦然接受命运的安排,从容接受这份荣耀。但是,你们不要以为把我投入监狱,就能扼杀新公民运动。置身于现代文明浩浩荡荡的潮流之中,必将有越来越多的中国人把公民的身份当真,把公民的权利当真,把公民的责任当真。总有一天,我十三亿中华同胞将从跪倒的臣民成长为堂堂正正的公民,这一天一定会到来的,这将是一个政治文明的国度,一个自由、公义、爱的幸福社会。得救赎的不仅是那些无权无势者,也包括你们,这些高高在上,但内心阴暗恐惧的人们。

今天,中国依然高扬改革的旗帜,我衷心希望改革顺利进行,实现美好中国的梦想。但是改革必须有清晰的正确的方向。继续摸石头过河是不负责任的,头痛医头脚痛医脚是不负责任的,项层设计回避根本政治制度也是不负责任的。中国向何处去,一个世纪之后,这依然是我们民族面临的根本问题。利益集团固化,经济趋于衰退,社会不公积累的矛盾集中暴发,中国再走到了一个历史的十字路口。顺历史潮流以实现民主宪政为目标,改革就会成功,逆历史潮流以维护一党专政为目标,改革必然失败。缺乏清晰的民主宪政的方向,改革即使全面深化,也很难走出清末中体西用的老路。今天,我们的遭遇很大程度上是在轮回一个多世纪以前清末改良主义者的悲剧,我为中华民族的未来依然充满的深切的忧虑。当改良的希望破灭,人民会起来革命。权贵们早已把财富和子女转移到国外,他们不在乎弱者遭遇的不幸和苦难,不在乎中国的未来,可我们在乎,必须有人在乎。和平改良的民主宪政之路是中华民族唯一通往美好未来的道路。一个世纪以前我们错过了,今天我们不能再错过。我们中国人民必须决定中国前进的方向。

同胞们,任何时候,不论中国发生了什么。我恳请大家一定要坚守自由、公义、爱的信仰。坚守自由的信仰,活在真实之中,追求一个世纪以来仁人志士们浴血奋斗所追求的那些普世的自由权利;坚牢公义的信仰,任何时候都怀有一颗的心,绝不为目标不择手段;追求一个民主法治健全、各司其职、各尽其能、各得其所、强有制约、弱有保障的正义社会,一个道义良心基石上的社会;坚守爱的信仰,这个民族有太多阴暗苦毒的灵魂需要救赎,人与人之间有太多的戒备、恐惧和敌意,这些埋藏于灵魂深处的魔鬼必须被驱除,但这驱除的过程不是仇恨,而是救赎。我们是救赎者。自由、公义、爱,这就是我们的新公民精神,它必将成为中华民族的核心价值,而这需要我们这一代人的奋斗、牺牲和担当。建设一个民主、法治、自由、公义、爱的美好中国,这是我们坚定不移的信仰。只要我们相信爱,相信光明希望的力量,相信人类灵魂深处对真善美的渴望,我们一定能把这个信仰变成现实。公民们,就让我们从现在开始吧,无论你身在何处,无论你身处何种职业,无论贫穷还是富裕,让我们在内心深处,在现实生活中,在互联网上,在中华大地的每一寸土地上,坚定而自豪地说出本来属于我们的身份—我是公民,我们是公民。

公民许志永
2014年1月22日

 

English translation re-posted from http://chinachange.org

For Freedom, Justice and Love — My Closing Statement to the Court

By Xu Zhiyong, January 22, 2014

This is Xu Zhiyong’s closing statement on January 22, 2014, at the end of his trial. According to his lawyer, he had only been able to read “about 10 minutes of it before the presiding judge stopped him, saying it was irrelevant to the case.”

 

You have accused me of disrupting public order for my efforts to push for rights to equal access to education, to allow children of migrant workers to sit for university entrance examinations where they reside, and for my calls that officials publicly declare their assets.

While on the face of it, this appears to be an issue of the boundary between a citizen’s right to free speech and public order, what this is, in fact, is the issue of whether or not you recognize a citizen’s constitutional rights.

On a still deeper level, this is actually an issue of fears you all carry within: fear of a public trial, fear of a citizen’s freedom to observe a trial, fear of my name appearing online, and fear of the free society nearly upon us.

By trying to suppress the New Citizens Movement, you are obstructing China on its path to becoming a constitutional democracy through peaceful change.

And while you have not mentioned the New Citizens Movement throughout this trial, many of the documents presented here relate to it, and in my view there is no need to avoid the issue; to be able to speak openly of this is pertinent to the betterment of Chinese society.

What the New Citizens Movement advocates is for each and every Chinese national to act and behave as a citizen, to accept our roles as citizens and masters of our country—and not to act as feudal subjects, remain complacent, accept mob rule or a position as an underclass. To take seriously the rights which come with citizenship, those written into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and China’s Constitution: to treat these sacred rights—to vote, to freedom of speech and religion—as more than an everlasting IOU.

And also to take seriously the responsibilities that come with citizenship, starting with the knowledge that China belongs to each and everyone one of us, and to accept that it is up to us to defend and define the boundaries of conscience and justice.

What the New Citizens Movement calls for is civic spirit that consists of freedom, justice, and love: individual freedom, freedom without constraint that brings true happiness, will always be the goal of both state and society; justice, that which defines the limit of individual freedom, is also what ensures fairness and preserves moral conscience; and love, be it in the form of kindness, tolerance, compassion or dedication, is our most precious emotion and the source of our happiness.

Freedom, justice, and love, these are our core values and what guides us in action. The New Citizens Movement advocates a citizenship that begins with the individual and the personal, through small acts making concrete changes to public policy and the encompassing system; through remaining reasonable and constructive, pushing the country along the path to democratic rule of law; by uniting the Chinese people through their common civic identity, pursuing democratic rule of law and justice; forming a community of citizens committed to freedom and democracy; growing into a civil society strengthened by healthy rationalism.

Common to all those who identify themselves as citizens are the shared notions of constitutional democracy, of freedom, of equality and justice, of love, and faith. Because taken as a whole, civic groups are not the same as an organization as defined in the authoritarian sense, having neither leader nor hierarchy, orders or obedience, discipline or punishment, and in contrast are based fully on the voluntarily coming together of free citizens.

It’s through acts of pushing for system reforms that geographically dispersed groups of citizens are able to grow spontaneously into their own, and by acting to hold authorities accountable and pushing for political reforms, establishment of democratic rule of law, and advances in society, that civil groups are able to grow in a healthy way. Pushing for equal access to education, the right for children of migrant workers to sit for university entrance exams where they live, and calling on officials to disclose their assets, these are civic acts carried out in precisely this sense.

The push for equal access to education rights particularly for children of migrant workers was a three-year-long action we initiated in late 2009.

Prior to that, we had received a series of requests for help from parents, it was then we realized the severity of this social issue. More than 200 million people across China had relocated to urban areas to live and work but found themselves unable to enjoy equality where they lived despite being taxpayers. Far more serious was learning that their children were unable to study or take university entrance examinations in their new places of residence, leaving no choice but to send them thousands of miles away back to their permanent registered addresses in order to receive an education, resulting in millions of Chinese children being left behind.

While many feel concern for the fate of left-behind children, rarely do they realize the best help they can offer is to tear down the wall of household registration-based segregation, allowing the children to return to their parents.

Our action consisted of three phases. The first took place over the first half of 2010, with petitions to education authorities in Haidian district and across Beijing, through deliberations to allow non-local students to continue their studies in Beijing as they entered high school. The second phase, which lasted from July 2010 to August 2012, consisted of petitions to the Ministry of Education to change policies to allow non-local children of migrant workers to take university entrance examinations locally.

The third phase took place between September 2012 until the end of year. It focused on pressing the Beijing Education Commission to implement new policies issued by the Ministry of Education. To that end, we gathered signatures and expanded our volunteer team of parents, and on the last Thursday of each month, we approached the Education authorities to petition. We submitted our recommendations and we consulted experts to research actionable changes to policies regarding educational paths for non-local children of migrant workers. We wrote thousands of letters to National People’s Congress delegates, making calls and arranging meetings, urging them to submit proposals during the two annual parliamentary sessions.

During the Two Sessions in 2011, the Minister of Education said in one interview that policy changes for non-local children were then being drafted. During the Two Sessions in 2012, the Education minister promised publicly at a press conference that changes to university entrance examinations for non-local migrant children would be released sometime in the first half of the year, and provincial education authorities would be required to draft implementation plans over the second half of 2012.

By June 28, 2012, a scheduled day for parent volunteers to continue petition work, the Ministry of Education had yet to issue any formal response. Parents decided then and there that they would return the following Thursday if by the end of the month the Ministry of Education failed to issue the new policy as it had promised. This led to the July 5th petitioning.

In August, the Ministry of Education finally released a new policy regarding university entrance examination eligibility for children of non-local migrant workers, along with an order for local education authorities to draft implementation strategies. By the end of 2012, 29 provinces and cities across China released plans to implement the policy except for Beijing. One parent joked bitterly that after a three-year struggle they had managed to liberate all of China, just not themselves.

I could see the tears behind the joke, because it meant that their own children would have to leave and take up studies in a strange place, in a possibly life-changing move.

As idealists, we were able to win a policy allowing children of migrant workers to continue their studies and remain with their parents, and yet the main impetus behind this change, the parents who lived and worked in Beijing without Beijing hukou, had not been able to secure for their own children the chance of an equal education. I felt I let all of them down, and many of them grew disheartened. I was compelled to go out and, standing at subway station entrances, hand out fliers calling for one last petitioning effort on February 28, 2013.

In the two petitioning events, one on July 5, 2012 and the other on February 28, 2013, we the citizens went to the education authority, or a government office, not a public place in a legal sense, to make an appeal. China’s Criminal Law is very clear on the definition of public spaces, and government buildings, locations of organizations and public roads are not among them. Therefore our activities do not constitute disruption of order in a public place.

Over the past three years, our activities have remained consistently moderate and reasonable. Certain parents did get emotional or agitated during the July 5th petition, and the reason was that the Ministry of Education failed to live up to its own publicly-issued promise, nor did it provide any explanation.

Yet despite this, their so-called agitation was merely the shouting of a few slogans, demanding a dialog with the Minister of Education, rather understandable considering they had gathered 100,000 signatures, behind which stand the interests of 200 million new urban immigrants.

And the response they got? Take a look at the photos of the scene. One parent who goes by the online alias “Dancing” was taken away by police pulling her hair. Was there no other way to escort her away? Was she exhibiting extreme behavior? Had she ever done anything provocative in the past three years? No, never! It hurts whenever I think of the event. We had pursued a very simple goal for three years, our approaches had been so reasonable, but we were assaulted with such viciousness. There were police officers who, with a prepared list of names in hand, sought them out and beat them.

In spite of what happened, I told them, over and over again, that they must stay calm and that we can’t stoop to their level. This society needs a renewed sense of hope, and we can’t behave like them.

The right to an equal education, the right to take a university examination where you live, these are concepts that the New Citizens Movement encompasses. Starting with changes to specific public policies and concrete system changes, in this case, for the freedom of movement, for justice, for love.

When China established the household registration system, or hukou, in 1958, it created two separate worlds: one rural, one urban. In 1961, China established the system of custody and repatriation. From then on, anyone born in a rural area who wanted to find work and try a new life in the city could be arrested and forcibly returned home at any time. In Beijing in 2002 alone, 220,000 were detained and repatriated.

In 2003, the custody and repatriation system was abolished, but it remained a long road for new urban arrivals to integrate with the city. In 2006, we discovered through our research in Beijing that there still existed as many as 19 discriminatory policies against non-local permanent residents, the most inhumane of them being the very policy that prevented children from living with their parents and receiving  an education.

We worked tirelessly for three years to win children the right to take the university entrance examination locally while living with their migrated parents. During the three years, I witnessed equal education campaign volunteers brave bitter winters and scorching summers at subway entrances, on roadsides and in shopping malls to collect more than 100,000 signatures with contact information included. I witnessed several hundred parents standing in the courtyard outside the Letters and Petition Office of the Ministry of Education and reciting their Declaration of Equal Access to Education. I witnessed several hundred parents and children planting trees in Qinglong Lake Park on the Clear and Bright Day (清明节) in 2012. Everyone wore caps bearing the same slogan: “Live in Beijing, love Beijing.”

I also witnessed the taping of a program on Phoenix TV where a little girl sobbed because she could not bear to leave her mother and father in Beijing where she grew up to go back to a strange place where her hukou is to go to school. In a hutong in Di’anmen (地安门), I witnessed Zhang Xudong (章旭东), a top eighth grader at Guozijian Secondary School, who was forced to go to a completely strange county high school in Zhangjiakou after graduating from middle school to continue his education just because he did not have Beijing hukou. A year later, Ill-adjusted a year later in language, environment and textbooks, he dropped out. He became withdrawn, not the happy boy he once was anymore. His parents have worked for nearly thirty years in Beijing but they are forever outsiders and second-class citizens in this city.

When I think of the hundreds of millions of children whose fates were permanently decided by the hukou segregation, of generation after generation of Chinese people who have been hurt by this evil system, of the countless Chinese who died in the custody and repatriation system, today I stand here as a defendant, filled with no grudges but pride for having worked to eliminate the segregation system with Chinese characteristics and for having fought for millions of children to be able to live with their parents and go to school.

The calls on officials to publicly declare their assets, these are our efforts to push the country to establish an anti-corruption mechanism. More than 137 countries and territories around the world currently have systems in place for officials to declare assets, so why can’t China? What exactly is it these “public servants” fear so much? Excessive greed and undeserved wealth do not just bring luxuries, but also a deep-seated fear and insecurity, as well as public anger and enmity.

When we go online to collect signatures and distribute promotional materials, or unfurl banners on the street, all to call on officials to publicly declare their assets, we are at the same time exercising our civic rights to free speech provided for in the Constitution. Our actions did not violate the rights of any other person, nor did they bring harm to society. While the speech delivered in Xidan has a few strong words, as a speech about public policy, they did not exceed the limits of free speech provided for by the Constitution and the law.

It is a normal occurrence in a modern, civilized society for citizens to express their political views by displaying banners, giving speeches and taking other actions in public venues. Law enforcement agencies can be present to monitor and take precautionary measures, but they should not abuse their power or interfere. In fact, when banners were displayed at the west gate of Tsinghua university, Zhongguancun Square and other places where no police officers were present, they caused no disorder, nor did they hinder any other people’s rights. They left after displaying banners. This conforms to our idea of a “flash action.” It had taken consideration of China’s reality and Chinese society’s tolerance capacity. We took quick actions in small groups, instead of larger gatherings, to make these public expressions.

Of course we hope that the sacred rights enshrined in the Constitution will be realized, but reform requires stability and social progress requires gradual advancement. As responsible citizens, we must adopt a gradualist approach when exercising our constitutionally guaranteed rights and when advancing the process towards democracy and rule of law.

Over the last ten years, we consistently pushed for progress through peaceful means, and we tried to effect change in specific policies through involvement in public incidents. We did so for the sake of freedom, justice, love, and for the sake of our long-held dreams.

In 2003, the custody and repatriation system was abolished but not without Sun Zhigang paying the price of his life for it. We, as legal professionals, made every effort in the process and we recommended, in our role as citizens, constitutional review on the custody and repatriation system.

For the past decade we have continued to strive to win equal rights for new migrants in cities, resulting in the introduction in 2012 of a new policy allowing migrant children to take university entrance exams where they have relocated with their parents.

We provided legal assistance to victims of grave injustices, such as the victims of melamine-tainted milk powder and the high-speed rail accident.

In 2008 when the Sanlu milk powder scandal broke, we brought together a team of lawyers and calculated the number of victims based on media reports. We proposed fair compensation schemes in accordance with the law, while working with the victims to successfully push the issuance of a government-led settlement plan. However, the government compensation package was far from from adequate for the damages suffered by many children. For instance, the cost of an operation for one child was nearly 100,000 yuan, and the compensation he received was only 30,000 yuan. So we continued to seek redress for the more than 400 children we had represented, bringing lawsuits all the way to the Supreme People’s Court, to more than a hundred courts across China, and to a court in Hong Kong. In July, 2009, when I was thrown in jail for the so-called “Gong Meng tax evasion” and when people from all walks of life made donations to help pay the fine imposed on Gong Meng, our volunteers in the south were sending a settlement of one million yuan to the home of a baby victim.

I am forever proud of that moment, and we will not give up our promise to the disempowered even when we ourselves are in trouble.

We have spent many winters out on the street delivering coats, blankets and steamed buns to the poor and homeless petitioners so that they would not die of hunger or cold silently in this bustling city.

Petitioning is rights defense with Chinese characteristics. In a society like ours comprised of relationships that belie privilege, corruption and injustice, to step forward in defence of one’s rights and dignity is something only the most stubborn of us dare do. But this small minority, when gathered in the nation’s capital, number in the tens of thousands. They get driven out of Beijing, or illegally detained, or beaten. In Beijing alone, there are more than 40 black jails — and we’ve verified the numbers — that have been used to illegally detained people. When we visited these black jails and reported the crime taking place, showing the specific laws it violated,  we were humiliated and beaten by those guarding them. Time and time again, I feel proud for sharing a little bit of their suffering.

Having chosen to stand alongside the powerless, we have witnessed far too much injustice, suffering and misfortune over the past decade. However, we still embrace the light in our hearts and push for the country’s progress in rational and constructive ways.

After proposing review on the unconstitutionality of the custody and repatriation system, we researched and drafted new measures to better manage beggars and the homeless. We pushed the educational equality campaign. We drafted a proposal for migrant workers’ children to take college entrance exams locally and our draft was adopted by most provinces and cities.

For our call for disclosure of officials’ assets, we even drafted a “Sunlight Bill” in March 2013. Raising an issue is not enough; solutions must be found. To oppose is to construct, for we are citizens of a new era, we are citizens responsible to our country, and we love China.

Unfortunately, you regard the existence and growth of these citizens as heresy and something to fear. You say we harbored political purposes. Well we do, and our political purpose is very clear, and it is a China with democracy, rule of law, freedom, justice and love.

What we want is not to fight to gain power, or barbaric politics by any means; but good politics, a good cause for public welfare, a cause for all citizens to govern the country together. Our mission is not to gain power but to restrict power. We aim to establish a modern and civilized system of democracy and rule of law and lay a foundation for a noble tradition of politics so that later generations can enjoy fairness, justice, freedom and happiness.

Good politics is a result of true democracy and rule of law. On every level, the government and the legislature must be elected by the people. The power to govern should not come from the barrel of a gun but through votes.

Under true democracy and rule of law, politics should be carried out within the the rule of law. Political parties should compete fairly and only those that win in free and fair elections are qualified to govern.

Under true democracy and rule of law, state powers are scientifically separated and mutually subject to checks and balances; the judiciary is independent and judges abide by the law and conscience.

Under true democracy and rule of law, the military and the police are state organs and should not become the private property of any political party or vested interest group.

Under true democracy and rule of law, the media is a social organ and should not be monopolized to be the mouthpiece of any political party or vested interested group.

Under true democracy and rule of law, the constitution stipulates and actualizes sacred civil rights, including the right to vote, freedom of speech and freedom of belief. The promise of people’s power should not be a lie.

These modern democratic values and measurements are rooted in common humanity. They should not be Eastern or Western, socialist or capitalist, but universal to all human societies.

Democracy is the knowledge to solve human problems. Our ancestors did not discover this knowledge. We should thus be humble and learn from others. Over the past thirty years, China introduced the system of market economy with free competition which brought economic prosperity. Similarly, China needs to introduce a democratic and constitutional system to solve the injustices of our current society.

The social injustice is intensifying in China. The greatest social injustice concerns political rights, which lie at the heart of other forms of injustice. The root of many serious social problems can be traced to the monopoly of all political powers and economic lifelines by a privileged interest group, and China’s fundamental problem is the problem of democratic constitutionalism.

Anti-corruption campaigns are waged year after year, but corruption has become more and more rampant over the course of the last sixty some years. Without democratic elections, press freedom and judicial independence, a clean government is not possible under a regime of absolute power.

The People’s livelihood is emphasized year after year, yet hundreds of million of people still live below the internationally defined poverty line. In remote and mountainous areas, corrupt officials even embezzle the subsistence allowances of only 100 yuan a month for the extremely poor. The wealth gap between the elites and the general public is ever-widening.

Hostility towards government officials and the wealthy is, in essence, hostility towards power monopoly that perches high above. Tens of thousands of families toil and worry about their children’s basic education, looking for connections to pay bribes just for kindergarten enrollment. How has the society become so rotten?

Humans are political animals, in need of more than a full stomach and warm clothes. Humans also need freedom, justice, and participation in governance of their own country. You say the National People’s Congress is China’s highest body of power, then again you say this highest body of power answers to the Party.

If the country’s basic political system is such an open lie, how is it possible to build a society that values trust? You say the judiciary is just and that courts hold open trials, then you arrange for unrelated people to come occupy seats reserved for observers in the courtroom. If even the courts resort to such unscrupulousness, where can people expect to find justice?

It should surprise no one that people wear frozen masks in their dealings with one another, and that whether to help a fallen elderly person can become a lasting debate. There is toxic baby formula, kilns using child slaves, and every sort of social ill imaginable, yet the perpetrators haven’t had the slightest bit of guilt or shame, and they think this is just how society is.

China’s biggest problem is falsehood, and the biggest falsehood is the country’s  political system and its political ideology. Are you able to even to explain clearly what socialism entails? Is or is not the National People’s Congress the highest authority?

Political lies know no bounds in this country, and 1.3 billion people suffer deeply from it as a result. Suspicion, disappointment, confusion, anger, helplessness, and resentment are norms of life. Truly, politics affects each and every one of us intimately. We cannot escape politics, we can only work to change it. Power must be caged by the system, and the authoritarian top-down politics must change. I sincerely hope that those in power will find a way to integrate with the trends of human civilization, and take an active role in pushing for political reforms and adopt the civilized politics of a constitutional democracy, therein realizing the hundred-year-old Chinese dream of empowering the people through peaceful reforms.

More than a century ago, China missed an opportunity to turn into a constitutional democracy through peaceful transition, sending the Chinese nation into a protracted struggle marked by revolution, turmoil, and suffering. The Republic of China, with its hopes for a market economy and democratic system, didn’t last long before totalitarian politics were revived and reached extremes during the Cultural Revolution.

Following the Cultural Revolution, China’s economic reforms led to a model of incremental reforms in which social controls were relaxed but the old system and its interests remained untouched, although new spaces created by the market slowly eroded the old system as reforms were laid out.

Political reforms in China could rely on a similar model, one in which the old system and its interests stay in place as social controls are relaxed and democratic spaces outside the system are permitted to grow in a healthy direction. A model such as this would actually prove a valuable path for China to follow.

We have built a community of citizens and rationally, remaining responsible to the country, taken the first small step.

You need not fear the New Citizens’ Movement, we are a new era of citizens, completely free of the earmarks of authoritarian ideology such as courting enemies, scheming for power, or harboring thoughts to overthrow or strike down. Our faith is in freedom, justice, and love, of pushing to advance society through peaceful reforms and healthy growth in the light of day—not acts of conspiracy, violence or other barbaric models.

The mission of civil groups is not to exist as an opposition party, although the creation of a constitutional democracy is inevitable for a future China built on civilized politics. Our mission is shared by all progressives in China, to work together to see China through the transition to civilized politics.

The New Citizens’ Movement is a movement of political transformation leading to democratic rule of law, as well as a cultural movement for the renewal of political and cultural traditions. A constitutional democracy needs a fertile bed of civilized politics in order to function, and it’s our collective anticipation and faith which serves as such a soil bed.

At the same time our country’s citizens seek faith in healthy politics, unscrupulous and barbaric politics must also be forever cast out from the deep recesses of each and every soul. This calls for a group of upstanding citizens to bravely take on such a responsibility, sacrificing ego to become model citizens. Each and every Chinese person shares this responsibility.

This is my responsibility. Having been born on this land, I need no reason to love this country; it’s because I love China that I want her to be better. I choose to be a peaceful reformer, carrying on with the century-old but unfinished mission of our forebears, advocating an unwavering commitment to non-violence just as I advocate freedom, justice, and love, and advocate peaceful reform as the path toward constitutional democracy.

Although I possess the means to live a superior life within this system, I feel ashamed of privilege in any form. I choose to stand with the weak and those deprived of their rights, sharing with them the bitter cold of a Beijing winter the way it feels from the street or an underground tunnel, shouldering together the barbaric violence of the black jail.

God created both the poor and the wealthy, but keeps them apart not so we can reject or despise one another, but in order for mutual love to exist, and it was my honor to have the chance to walk alongside petitioners on their long road to justice.

My decision comes at a time when my child has just been born, when my family needs me most, and when I yearn to be there by their side. After years now of witnessing the bitter struggles of the innocent and downtrodden, I remain unable to control my own sorrow—or, try as I might, to remain silent.

I now finally accept judgment and purgatory as my fate, because for freedom, justice, and love, the happiness of people everywhere, for the glory of the Lord, all this pain, I am willing.

This is our responsibility as a citizen group. In a servile society prone widely to submission, there will always need to be someone to be the first to stand up, to face the risks and pay the price for social progress. We are those Chinese people ready now to stand, with utmost concern for the future and destiny of the motherland, for democratic rule of law, justice, and for the dignity and well-being of the weak and marginalized.

We are kind and pure of heart, loathe to conspire and deceive, and we yearn for freedom and a simpler, happier life. We strive to serve society, and help those most in need, pushing for better society.

Bravely, we assume this responsibility, ready to forgo our privilege and secular interests—even at the cost of our freedom—to stay true to our ideals. Ready to put aside our egos with no thought of personal gain or loss, we respect the rights and boundaries of others, facing all beings with humility.

Such is the responsibility now upon you judges and prosecutors. Your responsibility is fidelity to the law and your conscience, to uphold the baseline of social justice, to neither be reduced to a lowly cog in this bureaucratic system nor debase the sanctity of rule of law.

Do not say you’re constrained by the bigger picture, because the bigger picture in China is not an order from above, but the letter of the law. Do not say you merely follow the logic of laws as you sentence me, and do not forget those sacred rights afforded all by law. Do not say this is just your job, or that you’re innocent, because each and every one of us is ultimately responsible for our own actions and we must at all times remain faithful to our own conscience.

As a society with a history of rule by man that stretches back centuries, the law in China serves a very distinct purpose. Regardless of acting as a defendant, a juror, or a legal scholar, I have always remained true to the idea of justice and I behoove you to do the same.

It has always been my hope China’s legal community will undergo an awakening of conscience, that you judges can gain the same amount of respect afforded your counterparts overseas, and it is my hope an awakening of conscience will begin with you.

Those of you watching this trial from behind the scenes, or those awaiting for orders and reports back, this is also your responsibility. Don’t take pains to preserve the old system simply because you have vested interests in it; no one is safe under an unjust system. When you see politics as endless shadows and reflections of daggers and swords, as blood falling like rain with its smell in the wind, you have too much fear in your hearts.

So I have to tell you the times have changed, that a new era of politics is afoot in which the greatest strength in society is not violence but love. Fear not democracy or loss of privilege, and fear not open competition nor the free society now taking shape. You may find my ideas too far-out, too unrealistic, but I believe in the power of faith, and in the power of the truth, compassion and beauty that exists in the depths of the human soul, just as I believe human civilization is advancing mightily like a tide.

This is the shared responsibility of us 1.3 billion Chinese. Dynasties, likes political parties, all pass with time, but China will always be China just as we are all Chinese. It’s our responsibility to build a bright future for the country. Our China is destined to become the greatest country in the world, possessing the most advanced technology, the most prosperous economy, the greatest ability to defend equality and justice throughout the world, and the most magnificent culture to spearhead human civilization.

But that’s a China that cannot exist under authoritarian rule. Ours is a China that will only exist once constitutional democracy is realized, a China that is democratic, free and governed through rule of law. Allow us to think together what we can do for for our country, because only then can we create a bright future. This country lacks freedom, but freedom requires each of us to fight for it; this society lacks justice, which requires each of us to defend it; this society lacks love, and it’s up to each and every one of us to light that fire with our truth.

Allow us to take our citizenship seriously, to take our civil rights seriously, to take our responsibilities as citizens seriously, and to take our dreams of a civil society seriously; let us together defend the baseline of justice and our conscience, and refuse without exception all orders to do evil from above, and refuse to shove the person in front of you just because you were shoved from behind.

The baseline lies beneath your feet just as it lies beneath all our feet. Together, let’s use love to rewake our dormant conscience, break down those barriers between our hearts, and with our love establish a tradition for the Chinese people of noble and civilized politics.

Here in absurd post-totalitarian China I stand trial, charged with three crimes: promoting equal education rights for children of migrant workers, calling on officials to publicly disclose their assets, and advocating that all people behave as citizens with pride and conscience.

If the country’s rulers have any intention to take citizens’ constitutional rights seriously, then of course we are innocent. We had no intention to disrupt public order; our intention was to promote democracy and rule of law in China. We did nothing to disrupt public order, we were merely exercising our freedom of expression as provided for by the constitution.

Public order was not disrupted as a result of our actions, which infringed on the legitimate rights of no one. I understand clearly that some people have to make sacrifices, and I for one am willing to pay any and all price for my belief in freedom, justice, love, and for a better future of China. If you insist on persecuting the conscience of a people, I openly accept that destiny and the glory that accompanies it. But do not for a second think you can terminate the New Citizens’ Movement by throwing me in jail. Ours is an era in which modern civilization prevails, and in which growing numbers of Chinese inevitably take their citizenship and civic responsibilities seriously.

The day will come when the 1.3 billion Chinese will stand up from their submissive state and grow to be proud and responsible citizens. China will become a country that enjoys a civilized political system and a happy society in which freedom, justice, and love prevail. The disempowered will be redeemed, as will you, you who sit high above with fear and shadows in your hearts.

China today still upholds the banner of reform, something I sincerely wish will be carried out smoothly allowing the beautiful dream of China to come true.  But reform must have a clearly defined direction, and it is irresponsible to continue “feeling the stones to cross the river,” just as it’s irresponsible to treat the symptoms but not the roots of social ills, and irresponsible to sidestep the fundamental political system in designing the country.

One hundred years on, where China wants to go is still the most crucial question the Chinese nation faces. As interest groups consolidate, the economy slows down, and accumulated social injustice leads to concentrated outbursts, China has once again arrived at an historical crossroad. Reforms will succeed if the goal remains to realize democracy and constitutionalism as in line with the course of history, and without question will fail if the aim is to maintain one-party rule in contravention of history.

Absent a clear direction toward democracy and constitutionalism, even if reforms deepen as promised the most likely result will be to repeat the mistakes made during the late Qing Dynasty, picking and choosing Western practices but not fixing the system. To a large extent, what we see happening around us today is re-enactment of the tragedy of the late Qing reforms, and for that reason I am deeply concerned about the future of the Chinese nation. When hopes of reform are dashed, people will rise up and seek revolution. The privileged and powerful have long transferred their children and wealth overseas; they couldn’t care less of the misfortune and suffering of the disempowered, nor do they care about China’s future. But we do. Someone has to care. Peaceful transition to democracy and constitutionalism is the only path the Chinese nation has to a beautiful future. We lost this opportunity a hundred years ago, and we can’t afford to miss it again today. We, the Chinese people, must decide the future direction for China.

My fellow compatriots, at any time and regardless of what happens in China, I urge everyone to maintain their faith in freedom, justice, and love. Uphold freedom of religion, stay rooted in reality, and pursue those universal rights and freedoms which were pursued and fought for and paid for in blood this past century by those also with lofty ideals.

Remain steadfast in your faith in justice, always stay true to your heart, never compromise your principles in the pursuit of your goals. Pursue a rounded and just democratic society governed through rule of law, where all fulfill their duties and are provided for, where the strong are constrained and the weak are protected, a society built on the cornerstone of moral conscience. Adhere to faith in love, because this nation has too many dark, bitter, and poisoned souls in need of redemption, because there exists too much vigilance, fear, and hostility between people. These evil spirits, buried in the depths of the soul, must be cast out. It is not through hatred that we rid ourselves of them, but through salvation. We are the Redeemer.

Freedom, justice and love, these are the spirit of our New Citizens Movement, and must become a core value for the Chinese people—for which it is up to our generation to fight, sacrifice and assume responsibility. Our faith in the idea of building a better China, one of democracy, rule of law, freedom, justice, and love, is unwavering. As long as we continue to believe in love and the power of hope for a better future, in the desire for goodness deep inside every human soul, we will be able to make that in which we have faith a reality.

Citizens, let us begin now. It does not matter where you are, what jobs you have, whether you are poor or rich; let us say in our hearts, in our everyday lives, on the internet, on every inch of Chinese land, say with conviction and pride that what already belongs to us: I am a citizen, we are citizens.

Citizen Xu Zhiyong

January 22, 2014

 

 


转载:我們這一代/許知遠 —許志永、余杰、郭玉闪

2013/12/11

一.
從京瀋高速公路的豆各莊出口下來,車子拐進一條引水渠旁的林蔭道,再往右轉就進村了。這是一個再平常不過的郊區村落,主街上滿是小商舖,從山西刀削麵到手機、雜貨店、還有從剃頭到按摩等服務都提供的美髮店,劣質的藍底或紅底噴繪廣告一個接一個、毫無章法地連成一片。路面上盡是塵土,車子駛過時揚起一片,讓人無處可躲。
這絲毫不妨礙人們在路邊從容不迫地吃下盤中的炒麵,再心滿意足地點上一根菸。他們有的青春年少、有的已近老年,全都裸著上身、肌膚黝黑。他們不是本村居民,而是不遠處那排「富力又一城」住宅高樓的建築工人。這時正是中午,他們享受著暫時的放鬆時刻,抽菸、喝茶、和安徽老闆娘無傷大雅地調笑幾句。街對面美髮店的姑娘斜坐在門前,專心打著毛衣,右腿壓在左腿上,有節奏地抖動著,紅涼鞋若即若離地掛在懸空的右腳上。
倘若不算那排正築起的住宅樓,北京市看守所可算是豆各莊中最龐大的建築群了。它的規模隱藏在院牆與鐵門裡,只能看到兩幢大約六、七層高的辦公樓。透過接待室的後窗,我模糊地看到一幢二層板房,灰色、簡陋,不知那裡是否是被關押人員所住之處,也不知這樣的板房有幾幢。

網路上流傳著許志永就關押在此。他不是我第一個被捕的朋友,卻可能是第一個讓我清晰地意識到「被捕」這種感覺的朋友。
二○○九年七月二十三日的夜裡,我們一起在北大附近的一家餐廳吃飯。席間,他保持著一貫的樂觀與信心,似乎九天前稅務部門突然造訪「公盟」和近乎瘋狂的懲罰措施,完全沒讓他心灰意冷。誰都清楚這是一次以經濟為名義進行的壓迫。
中國似乎總是充斥著這重重荒誕。這裡分明已然道德崩潰、衝突不停,但到處卻都在大談和諧社會;憲法保證每個人的言論自由,但是法律也懲罰所有可被認定為危害國家安全的行為;你說不清哪句話可能會一不小心就顛覆掉一個這麼大的國家;這個國家的一些官員公然四處尋找處女,色情服務無處不在,卻聲稱要用一款軟體,保護那些上網的青年免受色情內容的傷害……
專制政權總是以消除社會力量為首要任務,不容許人民因相同的志向和興趣而結合在一起,這有可能會分散權力中心的權威。當一個國家所有的社會力量都被清除時,這就是一個極權社會;國家力量無處不在,從你的工資單到臥室,從你出生一直到你死亡,還記得在情書中引用毛主席語錄的年代嗎?極權體制透過恐懼和欺騙,造就出孤立無援、喪失獨立思考的個體,而這些個體又是一場場荒誕的群眾悲劇的素材。
而三十年的改革之後,我們看到了市場力量迅速興起,卻沒看到社會力量的成熟。只有在健康而強大的市民社會中,才能培育出多元的價值觀,讓人們既能抵制強大的政治力量,又可防止淪為單向度的生產者和消費者。當權者瞭解這些,因此登記一家非營利公益組織,要比登記一家公司要困難得多。這其中的涵義一目了然——我允許你賺錢,其他你就不要管太多。
但許志永和他的同志想多管一些,因為中國人早已生活在一個扭曲的社會之中:經濟進步沒有帶來普遍的福利,貧富差距迅速擴大;政治權力與商業利益結成新聯盟,利益壟斷集團出現,普通人的成功機會不僅減少,而且利益更經常受到侵害……於是,在中國這台龐大的經濟列車轟然前進的同時,許多人從車上跌下,被巨輪碾過,但他們的叫喊聲卻經常被轟鳴聲所淹沒。
這些跌落的人群只能在家中嘆息,擠在上訪途中,或是徒勞地等待希望,舉著申冤的牌子默默站在法院、檢察院乃至中央電視台門前。媒體漠視他們的存在,因為媒體不但被意識形態控制,更加入了娛樂化的潮流。社會精英也很少關注到這些人,因為精英們要大談的是中國的全球領導力、經濟增長率,弱者們不過是發展中無可避免的犧牲品。官僚機構當然更不會有對他們興趣,這個政權建立的最基本哲學就是漠視人的尊嚴;人是工具、是材料,過去的國家主席都曾如此慘死,更何況是這些普通人。至於廣大的公眾,因為身邊有太多不幸,所以更要拚命向上爬,以期得到些許的安全感……
許志永和他的同志們滿懷責任與深情,想透過自己的法律知識幫助困境中的陌生人,減少這個社會的不公,給那些悲觀無力者一些希望。但他們想成立一家民間機構時,卻因為沒有政府部門願意出面擔任主管單位,而無法登記為民辦非企業。它不得不註冊為「北京公盟諮詢有限公司」以求生存。公盟旗下的數十位律師幾乎全部免費地為不同的群體提供法律諮詢,並以各種方式普及法律常識。從推動廢除收容遣送制度,到為鄧玉嬌案的辯護,再到協助受三聚氰胺奶粉影響的家庭,他們很少用口號和理論表明姿態,而是以具體的行動推動增長公民權利,為充滿絕望和嘲諷的公共空間增加希望。
他們也從未放棄任何一個改善社會的機會,包括在體制內。許志永自從二○○三年當選為北京海澱區人大代表後,就不斷利用他的新身分,揭露種種問題。他在某次演講中提到,公盟尋求的是團結、共識、參與、奉獻,他們要透過點點滴滴的努力,改變中國長久以來惡劣的政治生態。他們在某些時刻成功了,在另一些時刻則失敗了。他們當然也得罪不少當權者與利益團體——當他們為受害者尋求公正的同時,既得利益者的特權當然也因此減少了。
許志永生於一九七三年,他的出生地似乎決定了他未來的道路——河南民權縣。兩年前,我們因為一個青年組織而相識。這個組織的大部分成員,都是中國的成功者,投資銀行家、出版商、企業高級管理人員、藝術家,無一不是中國經濟奇跡的參與者和受益者。許志永談論的則是另一個世界,上訪者、無奈的父母親、被判冤獄的人——一個被人侮辱和損害的世界。他身上散發出的活力和強烈的正義感讓我折服,他既讓我欽佩,也讓我不安。我們對於這樣一個世界曾經撇過頭去,假裝他們不存在。我們無節制地崇拜成功者,不追問他們為何成功,不願為失敗者稍做停留,去理解他們的困境。我當然瞭解這個廣闊的中國暗藏無數的個人悲劇,倘若你在中國的縣城與鄉村旅行,會有一種撲面而來的窒息感;這不在於人的內在悲劇性,而是顯而易見的社會不公和制度性的傷害。但是,許志永卻決定將這些私人憤慨轉化成行動。
許志永在席間還試圖分析到底是什麼原因,造成了目前的困境。即使在分析這一切時,他仍舊保持著一貫的樂觀。我想起了兩年前和他的一次交談,當時他意氣風發,相信二○○八年的奧運會給中國帶來巨大的變革。當全世界都盯著北京時,政治權力會有所收斂,不同的民間組織都該利用此一良機,拓展公民社會的空間。在這之前,一連串的事件都表明了弱勢者經由網路的聚合與傳播效應,可能與強勢者進行一場大衛與歌利亞的戰爭,而且勝負未定。
那如今呢?這些年來,我看到的卻是政府權力藉著重大的國家事件而增長——大地震、奧運會,還有金融危機,似乎每次挑戰都必須藉由擴張國家權力才能應對。賑災只能由政府出面,傷亡名單是國家祕密,奧運會的一切都只能由國家承擔,最富有的是國家的中央企業,連年輕人都意識到公務員才是這個世上最美好的工作。那些自以為有性格的線民,輕易地彙聚成一股「愛國主義」的洪流,而社會力量則困難重重,身分不清、財政吃緊、經常處於被收編的邊緣。在意識形態死亡之後,黨與政府早已分化成不同的利益集團。當他們的利益受損時,都會毫不留情地動用手中的權力資源。
許志永在困境之中看到的仍是希望。他為上訪者提供法律援助,為受毒奶粉所害的父母索賠,他探訪京城的黑獄,他挨過打、被粗暴地拘留過,這些全因他試圖為一群受難卻失語的人尋求公正。或許,他在這一系列的個人際遇中,會感覺到人們對正義與良知的巨大渴望。這種渴望讓他溫暖、堅定。
那天晚上,我們在薊門橋道別。我記得他離去前所說的最後幾句話,其中有一句是:「最壞的結果是抓我坐牢,這也沒什麼。」我沒把這話太當真。我想,他們對許志永這位受到普遍關注的人物,會以更謹慎的方式對待,而不會下重手。何況,志永的方式是如此溫和,公盟的方式不是批評——儘管批評很重要,也不是改良,當然更不會是對抗,而是建設。更何況,他還是一名區人大代表,如果要逮捕他,是要區人大通過的……
但不到一週之後,就傳來了截然不同的消息。七月二十九日清晨五點,社區保安看到他被四、五個人帶走,不知去向……

二.
大約六年前,在北京豆各莊更遠的東郊的一間公寓裡,余杰和我玩笑似地講起他這些年被跟蹤、審查的經歷。我和余杰結識於一九九七年的北大,他比我年長三級,但不同系。我記得初次讀到他油印出版的文集《明天》時內心難耐的激動——思想的熱忱、批判的銳氣、寬闊的視野,這些全都混雜在少年意氣中了——而這不正是我期望北大校園中本應具有、卻幾乎沒有的氣質嗎?
我們成了朋友。比起文章中的尖銳,生活中的余杰善良、任性、小小的虛榮、喜歡回鍋肉、要命地單戀一位長腿姑娘。在我們相識一年後,一位出版商發現了那些油印的文集;突然之間,余杰在大學中、在青年間、在社會精英裡,成了炙手可熱的人物。距離天安門的那場悲劇將近十年了,這也是思想上沉悶和過度謹慎的十年,但一個年輕人跳了出來,用他明顯帶著稚氣的口吻表達他對文化、社會、政治的看法,他的勇氣和熱情感染了所有人。余杰顯得既年輕又古老,他才二十五歲,但是他所採用的方式又是中國人最熟知的——寫文章、談論思想、引起爭論、刺激人們思考。他是個啟蒙者,儘管思維有時過分單調。
他接下來的軌跡不再那麼順利。他的嚴厲批評態度讓校方難安,或許也讓更多的保守者不舒服。二○○○年畢業後,余杰發現原本該接收他的單位拒絕了他。他成了獨立作家,但依舊引起爭議。他在一份期刊上發表一篇名為《昆德拉與哈維爾──我們選擇什麼?我們承擔什麼?》的文章,借由中國知識分子對這兩位捷克作家的態度,試圖剖析一九九○年代的文化心理——我們太聰明了,而且缺乏嚴肅的道德立場。
似乎每一次公開討論,都是一種價值觀覆沒前的最後頑抗。在一九九三年對於人文精神的討論之後,人文精神被棄如敝履;而在這次關於智慧和立場討論之後,連立場的最後防線也潰敗了。
隨著名聲提升、交往圈子擴大、還有他在海外媒體上撰寫的文章,余杰逐漸被劃分到異議作家的群落。緊接著,他的著作無法繼續在中國出版,中國媒體禁止刊發他的文章,再接著,他成為一名基督徒……
我們的關係日漸疏遠。這既是因為我們離開大學之後,各自有了不同的生活軌道,也或許是因為我在潛意識裡覺得他的方式太過簡單。一個新時代到了,過分的道德判斷便會顯得既單薄又粗暴。
一個新的時代真的來了。網路熱潮在一九九九年席捲中國,成為新偶像人物的是比爾.蓋茨、史蒂芬.賈伯斯、丁磊、張朝陽,而不是羅素、卡夫卡、魯迅或是李敖;成為時代精神載體的是資本與技術,而不是書籍與思想。
我先是在網路公司工作,而後進入一家新興的報紙。這份報紙要報導的是中國融入全球的進程,跨國資本如何改造中國的面貌,技術如何衝破被禁錮的社會,市場化如何摧毀了計畫體制,民營企業家如何成為時代英雄……總之,我們似乎看到了一個不同的世界。去他媽的政治問題、意識形態問題、道德立場問題,這些東西如今陳腐不堪了。我們有了蘋果電腦和Google、出國旅行、充沛的工作機會與性愛;也可以大談矽谷精神與搖滾精神的相似之處,評論911與美國外交政策,偶爾還引用一下詹姆斯.喬伊斯(James Joyce)。我們心安理得地說,告別革命吧,中國需要的是漸進;放棄批評吧,我們要的是建設,強調道德是愚蠢的,因為它通往災難;我們聰明、時髦、以為無所不知、或許還挺酷的……我們是中國經濟奇跡的一代。
然而六年後,我的看法變了。我曾以為我們這一代可靠全球化和技術革命所帶來的自由和力量,將中國引入新的舞台。如今,希望猶在,那種淺薄的樂觀卻迅速地消退。倘若我們這一代不能正視這個國家深層的困境,還用膚淺的時髦來轉移我們對這種內在困境的理解和改善,那麼我們只能被證明是輕飄飄的一代。
因為許志永的被捕,余杰的形象再度浮現出來,我開始覺得他的那些憤怒和呐喊或許失之片面,但對這個社會仍然至關重要。如果一個如許志永這樣溫和的建設者都要面臨如此殘酷的對待,那麼中國蘊涵的巨大黑暗力量,是必須被不斷檢討和糾正的。一些曾經被我淡忘的書籍和人物再度進入我的腦海中。歐威爾的《1984》,還有尼姆勒(Friedrich Martin Niemoller)的那著名的詩句:

納粹開始追緝共產黨員,
我沒說話,因為我不是共產黨員。
當他們囚禁社民黨員,
我沒說話,因為我不是猶太人。
後來他們逮捕工會成員,
我沒抗議,因為我不是工會成員。
當他們衝著我來,
此時已沒有人能替我說話了。

因此,讓我們走出網路和消費主義營造的小世界,去迎接這個真實的社會吧。我們需要揭露黑暗的新聞記者、富有正義感的律師、有社會良知的商人、願意推動變革的官員、值得尊敬的非政府組織……他們恪守類似的準則,對未來有著相似的憧憬,他們用積極的思考與行動取代消極的嘲諷,用具體而細微的行動取代空洞的呐喊,富有激情卻足夠冷靜。
我們也要努力讓自己成為富有建設性的一員。拒絕身邊的謊言,做一個直言不諱的人;去簽名,表明你的立場;你成不了維權律師,卻可以為這些組織捐款、提供別的説明;你可以在你的報紙上,為這些社會不公提供更多的版面,而不僅僅是無聊的娛樂;你可以和身邊的人結伴旅行,真心理解中國的現狀;你可以在網路上發起free internet campaign,去抵制那該死的防火牆;你可以在你創辦的公司強調自尊和公平的文化,而不是那些拙劣的市場規則;做一個好醫生,讓你的病人能感受到人道;你可以在餐桌上對朋友說,我們別談論股票和房價了,我們來談論一本書,我們不要再聊那些藝人八卦了,來說說許志永他們做的事;放棄那些自我原諒,相信個人的力量,你會想影響周圍的人,接著這種影響會擴散開來,友愛、同情、公正、正直,這些美好的東西,會逐漸浮現而出……
我和余杰也恢復了聯繫。「我徹夜沒睡,放聲大哭」,二○一○年十月八日,余杰在短信裡這麼說。當時,他人正在三藩市,目睹電視畫面上諾貝爾和平獎委員會的新聞發布,劉曉波得獎了。
我多少能體會余杰淚水中的複雜成分,除了狂喜,更有這一路走來的酸甜苦辣。在過去十年中,他是劉曉波最親密的朋友之一,他們共同參與的獨立中文筆會是這個龐大的國家中一小群異議人士的臨時避難所。殘酷的國家機器固然可憎,反對者內部的爭吵同樣令人心焦。在這樣的雙重壓力下,保持獨立的人格、建設性的態度更是難上加難。有時你不禁沮喪,中國掉入了歷史的陷阱,它的統治者與反對者都有一顆專制的頭腦,總是重演著小暴君推翻大暴君的劇碼。與此同時,他們還多少不安地看到國際社會的曖昧態度,人人都急著想和中國政府做生意,讚嘆「中國模式」的成效,至於民主、自由、人權,倒像是歷史的陳舊之物。
「當你覺得一切毫無希望時,上帝突然給了你這樣一個禮物。」余杰說。他回到北京了,我們幾個朋友聚在他住處社區的一家餐廳裡。餐廳門口的長椅上坐著七、八個青年人,他們奉命來監視余杰,似乎擔心這個文弱的作家,突然會帶來不測的威脅。不過,這監視的形態與氣氛已經有了變化。昔日的意識形態早就失效,這些青年再也不會認定自己在報效黨與國家,他們會無奈地說「這是我的工作」,一臉身不由己的表情。別試圖激發起他們的人性溫暖,電影《竊聽風暴》(Das Leben der Andern)中的一幕從不發生。你在許多時刻會感覺中國社會正陷入漢娜.鄂蘭所說的「banality of evil——平凡的邪惡」,每個人都以看似無奈的方式讓這個系統繼續運行,別期待這強大的慣性會立刻改變。
我和余杰仍有許多分歧。我讚賞他持續的勇氣,卻對他過分簡單的思維感覺不適。我們在一起時,各自又回到了十二年前的角色。他是知識淵博的中文系研究生、新銳作家,我是個大學三年級的文學青年。這感覺令人既舒服,又彆扭。 我覺得余杰成了自己的姿態的俘虜,他成為一個重要的反對聲音,卻不再是個講究語言與思想的作家。
在聚餐隔天,他在自己家被軟禁了。四個小夥子日夜守在他家門口,其中一個還因為氣溫突然驟降而得了重感冒。來探訪余杰的人被攔住,他則不能離家。接著,他的手機被切斷,成為北京這座擁擠城市中的隔離者。這不自由的狀態可能要一直持續到十二月十日,諾貝爾和平獎頒發之時。他和劉曉波一樣,都是國家的敵人……

三.
二○○九年八月末,我再度見到志永。他在被關押了一個多月後獲釋,這次釋放和捉捕一樣,沒有具體說明,很有可能是輿論壓力的結果。這個經歷絲毫沒有影響他;相反地,他似乎更樂觀了。既然嘗過牢獄之災,還有什麼令人畏懼的?況且,獲釋本身也說明了中國社會正在進步。
像以往一樣,我們的交談仍是表層的、事物性的、甚至有點玄怪。他說自己在看守所時,內心出奇的平靜,滿腦子都是宇宙的起源、時空變化的問題。我想探究他內心的軟弱無助,還有他深切的焦慮、支持他的根本信念,但志永無意進入這種話題。我試著理解他的談話——倘若沒有這樣一種強大乃至封閉的自我,他該如何應對這樣的壓力?或許我不是個好的交談對象。在這層意義上,他單純,卻仍是個謎一般的朋友。
將近二年後,我再次見到志永,是在他的婚禮上。那郊外的莊園中的婚禮也是一次「異議人士」的聚會,維權律師、新聞記者、活動者濟濟一堂,當然還有幾名「國寶」。我記得神色不定的滕彪,他似乎剛從一次迫害中走出不久,他與我交流時,帶著明顯的創傷痕跡。我不知道如何形容和這些不算熟悉的朋友的關係,我讚嘆他們的作為,卻又知道自己難成為其中一員。我們都不滿這個政權,都期待一個美好的社會。他們是行動者,而且做出了個人巨大的犧牲;我是個旁觀者與描述者,盡可能逃離不必要的麻煩、更別說迫害了。他們也讓自己紮根在現實生活中,而我總像是無根浮萍,會欣賞與支持那些抽象的道德與正義,卻躲開人群與衝突。對於他們,我總有一種因為無能、膽怯而帶來的慚愧感。我記得,那場婚禮有一種動人的張力,是一種壓力下的溫柔。
又過了二年,二〇一三年的八月末,我聽到志永又被拘壓的消息,我竟沒有半點驚訝,或是其他什麼特別的感受。我又想起了二○○七年夏天,我們在五道口酒吧的那場長談;彼時,他意氣風發,相信一年後的北京奧運會給中國帶來一股巨大的進步力量,而我們也將迎來自己的進步時代。但歷史似乎證明,二○○八年竟成了中國停滯與倒退的轉捩點。巨大的成功讓共產黨政權更加傲慢,以一種更尖銳的方式來對付像他這樣的「異議者」。而且手段似乎越來越極端,越來越無所忌諱;從劉曉波到艾未未,這個政權想做什麼,就做什麼,愛怎麼整你,就怎麼整你。
也因此,許志永被監禁在家,進了看守所,他的組織被查封,這些似乎是再正常不過的事了。

四.
「索多瑪的臣民們會圍著你、羞辱你、詛咒你,向你扔石頭……在毀滅的大火與硫黃從天而降之前,他們願意毀掉一切希望……」在志永被捕後不久,郭玉閃在一封公開信中如此寫道。
在索多瑪城中當一個「義人」固然不幸,但一個民主的雅典也未必通往光明的結果。他接著寫道,「雅典也把蘇格拉底和他的新公民運動送上審判席,判決蘇格拉底該喝下毒酒受死。與索多瑪不同,雅典是被祝福的城邦,然而雅典的公民們也不能忍受蘇格拉底對他們美德的不停追問」。
郭玉閃和許志永的友情從十年前的北大就已開始了。十年來,這兩個昔日一起喝酒、談論理想和姑娘的青年已是中國公共生活中最令人矚目的角色,都致力於推動中國公民社會的生長與成熟。郭玉閃也因「傳知行研究所」的努力與在營救陳光誠行動中的表現贏得廣泛關注。
郭玉閃的感慨出人意料,更流露出少見的悲觀。我們認識不過半年,但我幾乎一下子就被他身上那股巨大的能量、當然還有喋喋不休的言說征服了。在一次共同參加的座談會上,他對剛剛上台的新領導人毫無期待,反而表明一種悲觀——控制會日益加禁,紅衛兵出身的這代人是不忌諱使用任何極端手段的。這論調與當時中國盛行的期望態度大為不同,大多人樂於相信在一個平庸的胡溫時代結束後,新繼任者會打破這個僵局。如今看來,這僵局的確開始打破,卻是一種向下的姿態。新領導用一種新的強硬手段來控制社會。
我從未和許志永建立起親密的朋友關係,與郭玉閃卻有一見如故之感。我猜是因為他身上有一種放鬆感,他很少為自己的行為賦予某種道德優越感,也很少流露出因此而生的孤立與自憐。他還保有對知識、生活的強烈熱情——從海耶克(Friedrich Hayek)的經濟原理到杜甫的感時憂懷,他都能滔滔不絕。他也有一種自嘲精神,回憶起戀愛時光時,更能讓我們笑翻在地。郭玉閃總給我這樣的感覺,他因為對人性與社會的複雜性都有充分理解,因此很難成為極端主義者,這意味著他有適度的圓滑,知道如何保護自己。他不止一次興致勃勃地講起他與「國寶」與員警的奇妙關係,由於被監視的時間太久了,他們早已彼此熟悉,甚至還捲入這些監視者的個人生活,為他們的子女上學出謀劃策。郭玉閃也知道,官僚系統並非鐵板一塊,適度的合作可能帶來更大的生存空間。面對這樣龐然的國家機器,他似乎從來沒有卡夫卡筆下的K那樣的焦灼,反而有一種好兵帥克式的戲謔。
在某些時候,我面對粗壯、健談、永動機式的郭玉閃時,心中會生出另一種歷史感,他讓我想起我認識的那些七○年代台灣的黨外政治人物。這些人接受過現代教育,同時有一種紮根於土地的實在感,一種面對時代變幻的江湖氣。我不知道這是否與郭玉閃的福建人身分有關,他的家鄉曾是洪門的發源地,而且過去三十年來充斥著發財致富的野蠻故事。
但很可惜的,不管是郭玉閃、許志永還是他的其他同志,他們似乎找不到讓能讓自己真正紮根的土地。他們從河南、福建的小城來到北京,獲取了現代知識,被一種正義感驅動,試圖去糾正錯誤,但卻始終面臨著巨大的孤立。十年來,郭玉閃依靠不同類型的基金會和媒體的支持、同志間的幫助,以及國際輿論對中國政府的壓力,得到了暫時的生存空間。相比於傲慢的國家權力,他們的聲音與力量是那麼地微小,儘管這微弱的聲音與力量在某些時刻會被媒體放大出來。
兩週前,我去探望郭玉閃,他的樓下整日停著一輛警車,他被限制自由行動。他在那個短暫的下午依舊興致勃勃,但偶爾還是說出這樣的話:「他們想要捻死我們真是太容易了。」這句話不是突如其來,而是有感而發。就在幾天前,許志永被捕,他的傳知行研究所被查封,正如四年前公盟的命運。一貫老練如他,也不知道這次的風暴會有多麼猛烈,他該用什麼樣的方式來應對。
索多瑪與雅典的比喻讓郭玉閃流露出少見的不確定性,這也讓他的反抗具有另一種個人的美感。人類漫長的抗爭歷史,歷來都是在這巨大的不確定與彷徨中進行的——人們明知自己的行動難以獲勝,卻仍舊堅持自己的主張。在很大程度上,郭玉閃、許志永等人都太過孤立了,他們從未得到足夠的社會共鳴,尤其是社會精英的響應。我們的時代在很大的程度上也像是葉芝所感慨的——最聰明的不承擔責任,最有熱情的卻缺乏頭腦。
又有一個人入獄了。我想起了郭玉閃曾有的感慨:「如果功權入獄,中國的『美麗島陣營』就形成了。」玉閃一直對台灣的民主轉型深感興趣。在他心中,他與志永仍是異端,而他們的朋友、一直以來支持他們的王功權卻是另一種角色。王功全不是個職業的異端,他是個成功的商人,分享到中國經濟奇跡的甜頭,他的舊識新知都是中國商界最活躍的人物,他也是個溫和耐心之人。在接受採訪時,他說:「我不是幹革命,我不希望中國爆發革命。我們的國家、民族在這重複的暴力更迭中損傷太慘烈了……」他也表達了某種困惑,「我只是做了一個公民應該做的,為這個國家的良性變革提供一些健康的批評之聲……這麼多年,我做的事情都是在不違反法律的前提下做的,我不明白為什麼這樣做點事、說點什麼都會被渲染。」這樣有高尚情操、溫和的手段的人物,如果仍不免遭此困境,這會驚醒沉睡的中國社會與精英群體嗎?
王功權真的被捕了,但帶來的震撼卻沒有想像中的那樣大。誰也不清楚這一事件是否會變成中國精英改變態度的分水嶺,他們可能繼續逃避,也可能因此審視自己的價值與使命;他們是經濟與社會地位上的成功者,卻是政治與道德上的侏儒。這個社會仍未準備為變革付出代價,搭順風車仍是主要的社會心理。
我想起了在綠島監獄參觀時,那麼多我熟悉的作家的名字都刻印在綠色的監牢門上;他們不是第一線的政治挑戰者,卻以作家的身分捍衛社會良知。我也捫心自問,或許要等到一群像我這樣自認溫和的批評者與旁觀者都站出來,大聲說出自己的主張,並主動接受得付出的個人代價時,中國社會才可能真正從這巨大的道德沉睡中驚醒。我們也有可能依然只是仍進湖中的小石子,沒有激起太多浪花,但至少我們履行了自己的道德義務。
多年來,我們一直在逃避這一切……
「陆续写于2009年夏,2013年秋」


Speech at Daley Plaza, Chicago

2012/06/05

My speech at Robin Hood Tax Rally, in Chicago, May 18th, as part of the kick of for series of actions during the May 2012 Chicago protest that climaxed on May 20th large anti-NATO march.

Text of the speech:

I’m standing here, as a Chinese exile from Tiananmen, as an immigrant, and as an Occupier for the 99%, to pledge again my commitment to nonviolence, to civil disobedience, to social and economic justice.

Back in 1989, we were inspired by nonviolent principle and carried out the largest civil disobedience with over 100 million direct participation in street protests.
Our struggle ended with bloodshed, and I narrowly escaped the Tiananmen Massacre. But we have continued our struggle nonviolently.

While in exile, here in America – my second home, I’ve learnt the precious but fragile nature of democracy. Democracy has journeyed from,
1 propertied white man 1 vote,
to 1 white man 1 vote
to 1 white person 1 vote
to 1 person, 1 vote thanks to the Civil Right movement
But Now we are trending to $1m, 1 vote.

Last Fall, Occupy Wall Street revived my spirit of nonviolent struggle, I AM BECAUSE WE ARE

We are the 99%, we got sold out when banks got bailed out
We are the 99%, our youth is carrying more than a trillion dollar student debts
We are the 99%, we bare witness in this land of ours with more empty homes than homeless families
We are the 99%, we can not care for the sick or feed the poor among our least fortunate,

We are the 99%, we are mad as hell

We are the 99%, we find strength in our commonality and in our numbers
We are the 99%, we are here to celebrate the dawn of a just & fair society
We are the 99%, we have stepped up to occupy

We dares to imagine
This is the beginning of the beginning
BECAUSE
The people united,
will never be defeated.
The people united, will never be defeated.

March on May 20th in Chicago with 25,000 protesters against militarism for social and economic justice including 99% Solidarity Riders from Occupy Wall Street movement from a dozen cities coast to coast


Reflection on Tiananmen, Spring of 1989, Part I

2009/06/04

The 1989 movement has a place in China’s modern history equal to the Opium War, the Taiping Rebellion, the 1898 Wuxu Reform, the Boxers, the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, the 1919 May 4th Movement, the Civil War, the 1949 founding of the People Republic of China, and the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. Its significance surpasses that of a mere short-term student movement, not only because of the great number of lives it touched nationwide during the movement, but also because it has long-lasting symbolic and political meaning that will continue to unfold for generations to come.

The mass movement in 1989 raised the fundamental questions that China faced in the 1980s. The questions are:

Can a technologically and economically modernizing China develop, prosper, and strengthen without implementing other Western values?
Can a patriarchal political system cope with the desires and aspirations of its youth and of its future generations living in an increasing interconnected world and open society?
Can dynastic cycles and the psychology of you-die-I-live in the zero-sum political transitions be somehow replaced by dialogue, negotiation, compromise, and co-existence?
Can order and progress somehow co-exist in China?
Is every movement in support of liberal tradition, (freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law), doomed to act merely as a prelude to each and every major transformation in China, only to be commandeered later by forces that are conservative and comparatively backward?

These are questions that concern the whole of China: the ruling party, the people, and the emerging political elite. Moreover, they are the same questions that generations of Chinese have faced in their relentless modernization efforts during the last century and a half. The answers to these questions were uncertain then, and still remain so today in the post-Deng Xiaoping era.

The 1989 movement dramatically raised those fundamental questions. Furthermore, they connected the old and new all in one theatrical play of love and hate, faith and betrayal, naiveté and realpolitik, hopes and disappointments, dark impulses and a sense of responsibility: factors that are all too human and all too Chinese to be transcended by the noble goals and stated purposes of the spokesmen of the movement. The familiar rhetoric used by both the government and the leaders of the movement; the speed and power exerted without the structure of checks and balances, which can corrupt even the purest souls; the acceleration of tension; the presence of a revolutionary fervor similar to that which inspired the youth of the Cultural Revolution; the broad and lofty claims made by the students; the inability of high government officials to cope with open challenge; the low capacity of the student leaders to genuinely control either the direction of the movement or the pace of its course; the tendency that part of the intelligentsia had to hover between serving as outside critics or as inside participants, as well as go-betweens for the government or as supporters of the mass and students are all symptoms of a nation and its youth caught in a timeless space.

What was exceptional about this movement? It was not a movement of national salvation. The country was not under major external threat or internal turmoil anywhere near to the degree of that existing in previous national movements. However, for the first time, the purpose of a nationwide mass movement was not national survival, but the betterment of the overall quality of people’s lives.

This was not a top-down, politically elite-engineered movement with a distinctive political agenda. There was no clear bearer of the political consequences prior to the movement. Political forces, both within and outside the establishment, became involved as the course of the events progressed. The reform-minded government faction and the self-styled aspiring liberal political elite outside the government all connected themselves with the all-powerful student-led movement only when it reached a level of national influence. For the first time, a nationwide mass movement was not solely a tool of political games and a product of political design, but rather a spontaneous, grass-roots demonstration of the general concerns felt by a large section of the society, albeit primarily urban.

There were several features of this movement that made it remarkable. The fit between student demands and popular sentiment was strong in the area of social justice and general hope for greater freedom and democracy. The general population expressed little criticism of the students’ insistence on a dialogue with high ranking government officials and for the generally confrontational ways in which the students conducted their affairs. This was unexpected for a people long accustomed to the paternalistic political mentality and the supremacy of political authority. The reason was not so much because of any clear and present danger that the country faced due to the inability of the government, but rather due to the partial yet important success of government engineered reforms and the psychological, intellectual, social, and political by-product–raised- expectations–brought about by those reforms. For the first time in China’s modern history, the country was enjoying an uninterrupted period of growth with relative social stability. Fast economic growth, like economic depression, often creates psychological up-rootedness. Thus, uncertainty and the raised expectations, which were not met, generated deep dissatisfaction in the general population.

The impressive organizational structure of the student leadership was, for the most part, an important and positive factor in the growth of the movement. Anyone outside of the governmental apparatus lacked the necessary experience in mass organization, yet despite their inexperience, the students demonstrated how quickly a spontaneous movement can turn into an orderly operation. This opened up the possibility of a relatively fast mobilization and organizational consolidation of a political alternative to the Communist totalitarian Party and its supporting police state apparatus. While many had hoped for this, more had feared that it was unfeasible. This is not to say that the organizational aspect of the movement is politically mature, on the contrary, the speedy disolution of leadership following the massacre indicated the imaturity by any sound political standard. It merely indicated a remote possibility of a organizational political alternative in the future based on a sponteneous movement.

However, the movement’s importance lies not in what it accomplished, but in what it did not. 1989 did not see reconciliation between radical public concerns and adaptive public policy. Compared to government crackdowns on previous political dissent, this movement accelerated under a relatively safe environment, and repeated stimuli from the government allowed it to continue. In the early phase of the movement, pressure from school authorities on student leaders, attempts by police to block demonstrations, government manipulation in response to the demands of demonstrators, and temporary setbacks were all practically affordable before the Massacre of June 3rd and 4th, and in turn, stimulated the movement’s growth. From my own recollection, and from the dozens of eyewitness accounts that have come out in the last eight years, it was quite clear that the longer the movement lasted, the less control the leaders of both opposing parties were able to exercise till the bloody showdown in Early June. We were also, to a significant degree, led by the course of events, over which the student leadership had little overall control.

In the decade prior to the 1989 movement, almost any public demonstration resulted in a call for fundamental political reforms. The Democracy Wall Movement followed Deng’s rise to power in the late 70s. The reopening of universities and reinstallation of local elections opened up the Election Movement. Japanese revision of official high school textbooks on the Sino-Japanese War triggered the New 9.18 Movement, and the nationwide student movement of 1986. In these series of events, the 1989 movement cannot be seen as sudden and exceptional. As many fundamental conflicts accumulate, and as long as symbolic anniversaries remain appealing to the public, another mass movement could rise at anytime. Will this likelihood cease when the opposition achieves limited but concrete changes in government policy or attitude? Will the government use even more force to crackdown? How far can gradual reform go? 1989 left these questions wide-open with the deep wound inflicted by the double impact of an intolerant government and the movement’s uncompromising leadership.

The price for radical reform remains terribly high. The dramatic ending of the 1989 movement demonstrated how high that price can be, and cast a shadow over future possibilities. When a mass movement rises again, there will be no room for naiveté. What could not be accomplished last time does not necessitate its realization next time around. History tends to repeat itself, and no matter how fantastic it may seem, things can always be worse.

This complexity of the 1989 movement in the Chinese national psyche, along with the Anti-rightist Campaign in the 50th and the Cultural Revolution from the mid-60s to mid-70s, have made the already tortuous path of China’s modernization even more uncertain. Imbedded in the complexity of post-Communist transitions in Central and Eastern European countries and the Former Soviet Union since the end of the 1980s, the triumph of the institution of liberal democracy and market economy is not so certain as some have claimed and many tend to believe. The “end of history”, as some enthusiastically believed after the fall of Berlin wall, remains an inspiration, and far from reality.

This is not to say that the chance that China will finally get on the liberal democratic track is slim. On the contrary, the opening up of China in the reform period, the experience of the 1989 movement, the collapse of the world Communist camp, and the great expansion of the global market have all provided favorable conditions for democratization in China. What this does say is that the process is not an easy one, and cannot be taken for granted. China’s liberal democrats face even more complex situations, for the Chinese population has more complex examples to learn from, therefore raising more complex expectations.

While liberal opposition in China and in exile have the dream of promoting a free society of responsible individuals, how to accomplish the goal, and to start with, how to assess China’s current situation continue to be difficult tasks. Contrary to the accusations by those in the Beijing regime and some China experts in the West, we fully understand the torturous path of China’s modern history. We have empathy for the pain that all the people in China endure. We are alert to the complex domestic and international security issues China faces, and subsequently, the political and social stability that is important for a balanced development.

We differ with the Beijing regime on the point of stability. Stability should not be mere stagnation, and progress does not necessarily lead to chaos. We believe that stability should be for the good of the country, not the party in power; and that stability is only achieved if a prospering China also develops respect for human rights, rule of law, an accountable democratic government, and responsible and peaceful participation in international affairs. Only then, will we have lasting stability.

We differ also from Beijing and the apparent majority opinion in the Western political and commercial establishments on the virtue of China’s economic development. We welcome the greater freedom in job allocation, travel, access to information, and civic association due to the economic growth, and most of all, the expansion of free market. However, when economic growth strengthens a regime, that increases the military budget, increases the budget for police surveillance, but also continually decreases the investments in education, in arts and culture, in social justice, and in government’s public accountability, this represents a negative growth in the overall quality of life. Pure economic growth as such does not necessarily mean it is sustainable, nor does it mean it is a balanced development.

On the same note, we do not believe that China’s problem have to be dealt with in a one-time, revolutionary fashion (though we respect people’s right to do so.) We support all the healthy reform measures including new Premier Zhu Rongji’s anti-corruption campaign and administrative streamlining. We believe that if gradual reform can reach the necessary depth, the price people have to share for the transformation could be lower than a revolution. At the meantime, we clearly see the limitation of the current reform, and its avoidance of genuine political institutional change. Though we appreciate the complexity of the problems China is facing, and understand that such a complexity is not only a political one; we believe that without a genuine political reform, balanced development can not be achieved.

Twenty years have gone by, since the bloody crackdown at the night of June3-4, 1989. Once again, Chinese paid the price of blood for reform at that night, and mass arrest, forced exiles which followed the massacre. Today, there are still prisoners in China who have been imprisoned in connection with the 1989 movement, relatives of the dead are still harrassed for their public mourning of their loved ones and for their appeal to establish a truth commission by the People’s Congress, and hundreds remained in exile, most of whom are not allowed to return to our homeland, even to enter Hong Kong.

So much loss, and so much pain have once again captured a generation in the bitterness that so many generations in Chinese modern history have tasted. And yet, it is the duty of us who survived the massacre to rise above the tortuous past for a better tomorrow.

Twenty years of time at least should give us the distance for a better understanding of the meaning of 1989 in Chinese history. Like the May 4th Movement in 1919, 1989 Movement means not only its particular historical events, but also a historical movement broadly defined. What a movement can leave us by and large depends on what we can discover in the process of our reflection.

(The essay so far is mostly from the preface of Almost a Revolution,  Ann Arbor Edition by the University of Michigan Press)

To be continued.


Wall Street Journal Article 6-3-2009: Survivors Confront Unsettled Legacy of Tiananmen

2009/06/03

This is reasonably balanced article, and it’s fair. Though the nuances of current China could not be covered by an article like this in the Journal. Here are several points:

Twenty Years Later, Members of China’s Student Uprising Still Hope for Democratic Reform, but See Only Economic Progress

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124397266329878327.html#articleTabs%3Darticle

As Chinese soldiers marched into downtown Beijing on the night of June 3, 1989, Shen Tong was west of Tiananmen Square with a group trying vainly to get the troops to turn back. The 20-year-old Peking University undergraduate, a prominent member of the democracy movement that swept the Chinese capital that spring, narrowly avoided injury. The girl next to him was shot in the face and killed.

Mr. Shen survived, and days later fled to the U.S., where he was hailed as a hero. He cowrote a book about the Tiananmen protests, and for years worked as a democracy activist.

Shen Tong was a member of the movement at the time

Democracy for China Fund

now, he struggles to define its impact.

The Wall Street JournalShen Tong was a member of the movement at the time (top) but now, he struggles to define its impact.

But Mr. Shen’s future didn’t unfold as he had expected. Today he runs a software company in New York that does business in places including China. He has returned to Beijing several times. While still a strong believer in democracy, he has grown increasingly uncertain about the meaning of the events of 1989.

“I’m not sure that we really made the difference that we intended,” Mr. Shen says. “We do know it was a tremendously significant event, but we don’t know what it really means.”

The historical significance of most big events seems to crystallize over time. But the legacy of Tiananmen has, if anything, become less clear in the subsequent two decades.

There is little uncertainty about what happened — though the details remain shrouded in official secrecy. In April and May of 1989, students, workers and others in Beijing and other Chinese cities held peaceful demonstrations for democracy.

The leaders of the Communist Party on June 3 sent armed forces into the capital to end the protests. By the time they cleared Tiananmen Square the next day, hundreds of people in the city were dead, mostly unarmed civilians. No one outside the leadership knows exactly how many.

The crackdown put a freeze on major political reform that has yet to thaw. But in the years after Tiananmen, the Communist Party claimed a new legitimacy with a re-energized program of economic development. China’s economy is now six times its size in 1989, adjusted for inflation, and could soon surpass Japan as the world’s second largest after the U.S.

Development has been uneven — farmers and factory workers have benefited much less than the urban middle class, and corruption and human-rights abuses are pervasive. But at the same time, economic liberalization and technological change have given many Chinese the independence to live as they choose, as long as they don’t challenge Communist Party rule.

Within China, the government has largely buried the history of 1989. Most young people know little or nothing about those events. Most of those who do have accepted the government’s claim that it was forced to act to prevent chaos. Those who know what happened generally speak of it only among friends or family.

To stifle discussion of Tiananmen around its anniversary, the government detains or warns dissidents, and blocks access to Web sites that could carry sensitive content. On Tuesday, Twitter Inc. users across China reported that the popular micro-blogging service appeared to be blocked, the latest in a series of sites carrying user-supplied content that have experienced access disruptions recently in China. Chinese officials couldn’t be reached for comment.

Meanwhile, a world that recoiled at the bloodshed in June 1989 has accepted China’s leaders and their central role in global affairs. Some of those most opposed to the Communist Party’s practices have felt compelled to deal with it.

Last week, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi — a longtime China critic, who was expelled from the country in 1991 after unfurling a banner in Tiananmen Square memorializing those killed in the crackdown — returned to Beijing to talk to Chinese leaders about cooperation on climate change.

Those who helped shape Tiananmen also have differing views of its legacy.

Wu’er Kaixi, a student leader in 1989 and No. 2 on the government’s most-wanted list after the crackdown, says the democracy movement should be credited with much of China’s economic progress in the past 20 years, as the government accelerated economic reforms to regain legitimacy it lost on June 4.

“The longer the time passes, the more I think of it as a great movement,” says Mr. Wu’er, who has lived in exile since 1989.

Wang Juntao, whom the government labeled an orchestrator in 1989, believes China’s people are closer to forcing democratic change now.

[A Chinese couple take cover at an underpass as tanks deploy in Beijing to stop the 1989 demonstrations. ] Associated PressA Chinese couple take cover at an underpass as tanks deploy in Beijing to stop the 1989 demonstrations.

The Chinese people have “learned a lesson. They’ve found that we were right — without democracy the Chinese government will become more violent and self-interested,” says Mr. Wang, now 50, who was imprisoned before being expelled in 1994 to the U.S., where he has lived ever since. “I think I will definitely return to China, and I will be successful. Finally, we will win [China] back.”

Other participants have returned to China, or never left. Most lead lives that have nothing to do with politics. “People generally have tremendous difficulty linking that part of their life with their life today — except the extreme minority who carried on the movement at great cost,” Mr. Shen says. For many people in China, he says, June 1989 is “frozen in history.”

Mr. Shen first returned to China in 1992. After arriving in the U.S. in 1989, he cowrote “Almost a Revolution,” about his involvement in the democracy protests, completed his undergraduate degree at Brandeis University, and started graduate studies at Boston University and Harvard University. He also started a group called the Democracy for China Fund.

In China, he traveled around speaking to other activists. Back in Beijing, the night before a scheduled news conference, police arrested him at his mother’s apartment. He was released after eight weeks and put on a plane back to the U.S., where he vowed to continue the fight for democracy.

Chinese authorities also detained several people who met with Mr. Shen. One wasn’t released for nearly two years. Fellow democracy activists criticized Mr. Shen for endangering his collaborators. Mr. Shen said that the others were aware of the risks. Still, he says today, “They are on my conscience.”

Mr. Shen stayed away from China for nearly a decade. He continued to work for democracy, but his interests broadened. In the mid-1990s, he started businesses in publishing and television production. He stopped his doctoral studies without a degree.

In May 1999, U.S.-led forces in Yugoslavia bombed China’s Embassy in Belgrade, killing three. Washington said the incident was an error, but the bombing triggered protests by college students in Beijing outside the American Embassy.

Watching the protests on TV, Mr. Shen was struck by how effective the government had been in replacing the democratic ideals of previous generations with a combination of nationalism and economic growth.

“I felt profound sadness,” he says. “What I hadn’t realized is that this combination, that rests upon very systematic repression of historical memory, was working.”

In 2000, Mr. Shen founded a new company, VFinity, which sells software that clients use to manage and search video and other digital content. He married and had two children — changes that he says also realigned his thinking.

“I realize how much involuntary suffering my family went through” during his initial years of activism and exile, Mr. Shen says.

In 2001, Mr. Shen returned to Beijing to visit family. It was the first of about half a dozen return visits — each requiring agreements in advance with Chinese authorities not to engage in political activities while there.

As his business developed, China’s market beckoned. In 2006, VFinity opened an office in Beijing. Some critics have suggested VFinity’s software could be used by Chinese authorities for surveillance purposes. Mr. Shen says VFinity hasn’t sold its product to police agencies, though he says it is impossible to ensure they don’t ultimately get access to the software.

Mr. Shen says there is no simple formula to reconcile his feelings about the Chinese government with the practical considerations of doing business there.

“The more distance I have, the more I realize what I don’t know,” he says.

Overall, he says, the country’s economic reform policy, without political change, “is clearly not sufficient, but it’s better than the alternative” of no reform at all.


BBC World Service Radio Interview: Shen Tong May 29th, 2009

2009/06/01

This interview is surprisingly good, with tough but fair questions, with almost no edit that would take my answers out of context.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/interview

There is one part during the interview that needs more clarification due to limited time:

Question: “What the movement exciting for you?” or Confusing.

Answer: it’s both.

Question: The confusion of the focus of the protests?

Answer:  no. the movement largely stayed its course both in pursuit of end of corruption, greater democracy and freedom, and in non-violent means.

What left unsaid during the recorded interview: the confusion really comes from two sources

A. what we’ve known by now because of Tiananmen Papers, and the Prisoner of the State among other courses that explained the inner working of the Chinese government during the Spring of 1989 was equally, if not more, deciding factors that affected the outcome of the events in Spring 1989 in China. The street theater was only part of the story.

B. The street protests went much further than anyone expected. No one on the protest side had the experience nor the psychological readiness to effectively organize and lead strategically.

Interview: Shen Tong 29May09
Friday, May 29, 2009 6:32 PM
Carrie Gracie talks to Shen Tong. Twenty years ago he was one of the young Chinese student leaders in the Tiananmen Square democracy protests. In the bloody aftermath he fled to the United States and became an activist in exile. Now at the age of 40 he runs a software company in New York and has made a handful of visits back to Beijing. So how does he look back on those heady events of 1989?


History’s Hang-Over – on the 20th anniversary of Tiananmen Massacre

2009/05/24

by Shen Tong

The Party

We were rocks rolling into the early summer
Tiananmen Square was built around us with flair
Freedom grabbed spring for a love affair

We stripped ourselves bare
Our excited voices turned higher
Our fists clinched tighter

We came
we dreamed in exhaustion

by the next year
there would only be spring here

Dreams are intoxicating
Even rolling rocks got drunk

The rolling rocks stopped rolling
The rest …

is history’s hang-over

The Farewell

Street led roaring trucks into Beijing
Ignorance consumed Marshall Law soldiers
Tanks reconstructed pavement in a trance
Bullets invited young bodies for a dance

The color of blood
The sound of gunfire
The burning buses and cars

The party was a hit
But we were the uninvited guests
Our pride was our last stands
“Somebody had to stop” the party at once

The rolling rocks were acquiring moss
The rest …

is history’s hang-over

Wang Weilin

The Hang-over

Everybody got their 15 minutes then got sober
People waited in line even after the party was over
Anyone who was not there claimed ancient ties to the dreamer.
And the host was embarrassed
They classified the party as an urban legend

The scary kind, you can only whisper about
Not talking about it at all would be better

Let bygones be gone
Let trauma to be frozen and suppressed
Let’s chant a thousand times over

“we are better off with the massacre”.

Spring came, and spring went, time got wise and clever

Freedom hoped
Freedom insisted
Freedom did not overcome

The fling with spring is too inconvenient to remember
Everyone is now a practical philosopher
Why make love,

when one can make money big and make war bigger

The rolling rocks are covered with moss
The rest …

is history’s hang-over

© copyright, Shen Tong 2009


中文媒体错译 Fortune Small Business

2007/11/21
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关于中文媒体严重错误翻译,不加核实而广泛转载美国杂志Fortuen Small Business关于沈彤及其媒体软件公司VFinity的报道。
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  • 错误翻译的几个重点
  • 翻译来源-多维新闻-“更正“过程中的恶行恶状
  • 香港明报, 新加坡联合早报, 美国之音 (VOA), 台湾中国时报 (Taiwan) 等转载过程中不做基本专业核实
  • 多维等媒体的错译中文全文
  • Fortune Small Business的英文原文
  •  

     

    错误翻译的几个重点

    1. 沈彤“强调,现在对他最重要的事是成功和致富”

    原文是沈彤对于89当年的学生现在强调发财致富而感慨,不是他自己的想法。
    Tong went on to muse about his generation of activists, few of whom are still confronting the Chinese government. “In our 20s we thought that democratization and ending corruption were the most important things,” he said. “Now the most important things are succeeding and becoming affluent.”
    直译:彤若有所思地(muse)谈到他那一代的活动家已经很少与政府冲突。

    上下文:此段采访的整个谈话背景是沈彤与记者多次感慨他在国内遇到的八九一代当年以生命与政府抗争,而现在很多人不问政治正义公理,一心致富。所以这次沈彤回国没有像1992年那样有民运使命,而是想观察和了解。

    原文的上下两段翻译:
    上段:当我问他是不是不问政治了,他摇头:“当然不是,”又很不耐烦地大声(snapped)说,“我不是带着使命而来。我在观察(中国的现状),【而且】我要诚实地反思(流亡后十年所从事民运)的效果。”(Tong shook his head when I asked whether he considered himself post-political. “Of course not,” he snapped. “I’m post-political only in the sense that I’m not coming back on a mission. I’m observing. [But] if I’m being honest, I have to ask if I’m making a difference.”)

    下段:了解沈彤的人同意,他不是被财富驱使的。(Those who know Tong best, however, agree that he isn’t particularly motivated by money. )

    2. 沈彤“北京推销监控软件”

    VFinity的软体平台不是过滤或监控技术,而是一个Web媒体平台,让使用VFinity平台的企业中的任何人都可以储存、管理、制作、编辑、发布、分享多媒体内容。 就如电话和电话监控的区别一样。

    沈彤即不像报道中提到的“经常往返中美两地”,更没有在中国推销产品。

    3. 沈彤“推销可以被国家安全部门用作监控公众的电脑软件”

    原文称VFinity在中国的客户包括中国政府的各个部委 (various branches of the Chinese government), 但这是记者的演绎和猜测。随后记者用以下方式诠释他的猜测:彤对于他和政府部门合约的谨慎是可以理解的,他否认VFinity向军方或国安部门直接售卖软件。但彤承认他无法控制什么人从零售商购买他的产品。

    Clients include Brandeis University, Taiwan’s National University and various branches of the Chinese government.

    Tong is understandably reticent about his government contracting work in China. For the record, he denies that VFinity sells software to the Chinese military or other state security agencies. But Tong admits that he can’t control who buys his products through local resellers.

    上下文:采访中的这一段,是记者在从北京回到美国之后,想以被中国政府监控的八九学生卖给中国政府监控软件的角度影射沈彤和VFinity。但有事实上的困难,

    1. VFinity不是监控软禁,甚至不是过滤软件。对此,记者多次采访VFinity的员工和客户而不能证实VFinity有任何监控能力,所以在文章中从没有直接说VFinity是监控软体。但他在一个采访的追问中提到,如果一个监控机构需要处理大量的影音内容,用VFinity是否有帮助。VFinity的一个北京同事回答:当然,VFinity是很强的影音标记和搜索引擎,任何影音库都可以获益;不过这就像说一个图书检索系统是文字控制的警察国家的帮凶,或是说政府电话监控要让发明电话的爱迪生承担责任一样荒唐。不过记者在最后的文章中只用了这个回答的前三分之一句。
    2. VFinity在中国事实上没有监控机构和军方的用户。记者对于政府用户的猜测一直是采访中重复的问题,但不能得到证实。后来这个问题就变得更为广泛的两个问题
      1. “VFinity在中国的用户有没有可能是政府用户?” VFinity同仁的回答:我们的现有市场是大学和文化机构。在中国国内,有预算的大学和文化机构大多是官方办的。我们的目标市场之一是广播电视,在国内全是政府所有。
      2. “VFinity的产品有没有可能接触到其他政府机构?“  VFinity同仁的回答:我们正在以开发经销商方式拓展市场。经销商有可能接触到各种客户。
    - “有逻辑可能但无事实”变成“有”;
    - “中国的大学和文化机构”变成“中国政府的各个部委”;
    - VFinity和沈彤直接的澄清变成“他否认和谨慎是可以理解的”。

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    翻译来源-多维新闻“更正”过程中的恶行恶状

    VFinity市场部门在文章发表之后对直接失实的内容作出更正。更正内容如下。但多个报刊和网站已经以讹传讹。对于英文原文中,记者凭借想象的部分没有事实依据,但也没有事实错误,只是为了抢眼的标题和自己对中国的看法来剪裁事实、自说自话,违反新闻报道和分析的基本专业标准。而原译者多维的翻译与标题就有太多事实上的谬误。

    VFinity市场部门作出的更正(中英文)

    多维今天关於万视科技VFinity的头条报导严重失实而且误导大众。VFinity的软体没有中国国安和中国军方的使用者。没有中国政府用VFinity来监视民众。VFinity的软体平台不是过滤或监控技术,而是一个Web媒体平台让使用VFinity平台的企业中的任何人都可以储存、管理、制作、编辑、发布、分享多媒体内容。 多维对财富杂志文章的翻译也非常不准确。例如,财富杂志通篇没有一处指出中国国安是VFinity客户,也没有指出中国政府用VFinity来监视民众。

    The article about VFinity published in today’s Douwei News (DWNEWS.COM) is inaccurate and grossly misleading. VFinity software is not being used by the Chinese military and security for surveillance. VFinity is not surveillance and filtering software, rather it is designed to provide all users OF AN ENTERPRISE THAT LICENSED VFINITY SOFTWARE open access to digital content through a Web browser from anywhere. (chinesenewsnet.com) Further, Douwei News did not accurately translate the Fortune article profiling Shen Tong. For instance, no where in the article does Fortune charge that the Chinese National Security is using Vfinity software, nor that Chinese government is using Vfinity software to spy on its own people.” (chinesenewsnet.com)

    多维社编者按 (chinesenewsnet.com)

    多维社4日收到声称代表沈彤的来信,对多维关於沈彤的一篇报导提出意见,指”多维今天关於万视科技VFinity的头条报导严重失实而且误导大众”,事实上,有关沈彤公司软件被中国政府所用,早已有消息人士向多维社提供。有关沈彤的行为,多维社所披露的,只是所知的一小部分。 最近,财富杂志文章小企业版的文章,对沈彤公司软件的可能流向作了报导。读者可参考英文原文,作出判断。 多维社并没有”非常不准确”地翻译财富杂志文章小企业版文章的原文,来信有关所指并不是多维所为。 我们对我们所披露的内容深具信心。但是,为了让沈彤代表的意见得到表达,多维社全文发表其来信。

    注:多维和明镜(chinesenewsnet.com)在2009之前有何频主持,后易手卖给于平海。在多维错误的中译文发表之后,网民做了中英文对比,随即有多条耻笑多维翻译的评论。几天之后,多维把这篇自称从内容到翻译都“深具信心”的译文联同网民评论从网站上删除了。无论是良心发现、知耻、策略或商业考量,这个行为本身值得肯定。但多维的文章与标题已经以讹传讹被广泛转载,而更正和删除却无一家转载。多维的这种做法与中国政府在2005年之后的网路与新闻控制政策一样,积极和巧妙地引导舆论,以“翻译”和“转载”外电和其他刊物的方法,从有多种声音的自由媒体环境中,挑选中国政府定义为敏感人士的负面报道。必要时,断章取义。 “沈彤”一词是已知的中国政府网路监控的1400多个敏感词之一,在中国国内的搜索引擎上少有的沈彤新闻里,已知有新加坡联合早报“转载”香港明报(转载多维社)的“新闻 - 新闻 > 世界报刊文萃学运领袖北京推销监控软件 沈彤强调发财最重要。

    香港明报, Singapore 联合早报, 美国之音 (VOA), 中国时报 (Taiwan) 等媒体以讹传讹, “转载”的中译全文

    【18年的记忆】之 18年前的领袖北京推销监控软件 18年前的领袖北京推销监控软件 沈·彤强调发财最重要

    2007-05-05


    香港明报报道,18年前的北京学  运领袖沈·彤目前已成为美国一家软件开发公司的老板。沈·彤的公司在北京设有办公室,而他则经常往返中美两地,推销可以被国家安全部门用作监控公众的电脑 软件。沈·彤否认向军方或国安部门直接售卖软件。他并强调,现在对他最重要的事是成功和致富,“我无法控制什么人从零售商购买我的产品。”

    美国《财富》杂志小企业版日前发表名为《一个天安门造  反者成为富翁》(A Tiananmen rebel turns capitalist)的报道。指今年39岁的沈·彤于2000年在纽约经营一家软件公司万视科技(VFinity),公司的主要产品是一种供大学、电视 台使用的搜索软件。该软件就像一个图像化的Google,允许任何用户创作或编辑图象文件,然后上传至公司服务器或网上任何地方,而且能够让用户轻易地就 找到文件。

    美国创立科技公司

    报道称,沈·彤的公司在纽约、台北和北京都有办公室,客户包括台湾大学和中国政府。记者问沈·彤,如果其开发的软件直接或间接地被用作监控公众的工具, 是否违背他的道德原则。沈·彤耸耸肩说:「我从不怀疑技术既可以用在好的和坏的目的上。电脑和电话也可以被好人和坏人使用。」

    软件可作监控工具

    报道称,中国政府允许沈·彤返回北京,条件是不涉入政治活动,但他在北京的活动亦被监视。外出时经常有挂着政府车牌的私家车跟着他。沈·彤接受访问时, 对“天 安·门”一代人进行反思。他说:“在我们20多岁的时候,我们认为民主化和反腐败是最重要的事情,而现在最重要的事情,是取得成功,是致富。”

    首个离国学生领袖

    1989年,沈·彤是北京大学生物系学生,曾任学   运组织「高  自  联」常委。事件后,他逃往日本,之后转赴美国,成为第一个安全脱身的学  运领袖。沈·彤抵美后,除了继续读书,还与吾·尔-开-希共同成立「中国民~~主基金会」。到90年代后期,沈·彤把注意力从政治转到商业,2000年创 办万视科技公司,现有员工45人。

    学运领袖北京推销监控软件 沈彤强调发财最重要

    (2007-05-05)

    (联合早报网讯)明报报道,18年前的北京学运领袖沈彤目前已成为美国一家软件开发公司的老板。据美国传媒报道,沈彤的公司在北京设有 办公室,而他则经常往返中美两地,推销可以被国家安全部门用作监控公众的电脑软件。沈彤否认向中国军方或国安部门直接售卖软件。他并强调,现在对他最重要 的事是成功和致富,「我无法控制什麽人从零售商购买我的产品」。

    美国《财富》(FORTUNE)杂志小企业版日前发表名为《一个天安门造反者成为富翁》(A Tiananmen rebel turns capitalist)的报道。指今年39岁的沈彤於2000年在纽约经营一家软件公司万视科技(VFinity),公司的主要产品是一种供大学、电视台 使用的搜索软件。该软件就像一个图象化的Google(互联网搜寻器谷歌),允许任何用户创作或编辑图象文件,然後上传至公司服务器或网上任何地方,而且 能够让用户轻易地就找到文件。

    美国创立科技公司

    报道称,沈彤的公司在纽约、台北和北京都有办公室,客户 括台湾大学和中国政府。该杂志记者问沈彤,如果其开发的软件直接或间接地被用 作监控公众的工具,是否违背他的道德原则。沈彤耸耸肩膀说:「我从不怀疑技术既可以用在好的和坏的目的上。电脑和电话也可以被好人和坏人使用。」

    软件可作监控工具

    报道称,中国政府允许沈彤返回北京,条件是不涉入政治活动,但他在北京的活动亦被监视。外出时经常有挂政府车牌的私家车跟他。沈彤 接受访问时,对天安门一代民运分子进行反思。他说:「在我们20多岁的时候,我们认为民主化和反腐败是最重要的事情,而现在最重要的事情,是取得成功,是 致富。」

    首个离国学生领袖

    1989年沈彤是北京大学生物系学生,曾任学运组织「高自联」常委。六四事件後,他逃往日本,之後转赴美国,成为第一个安全脱身的学运 领袖。沈彤抵美後,除了继续读书,还与另一名被通缉的学运领袖吾尔开希共同成立「中国民主基金会」。到90年代後期,沈彤把注意力从政治转到商 业,2000年创办万视科技公司,现有员工45人。

    Muzi.com : 木子网(中文) : 夜光新闻

    沈彤–昔日的民运人士,今天变身企业家
    2007-05-04

    分类
    腐败
    网路搜寻
    国家
    中国
    美国
    台湾
    泰国
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    分类
    地区
    洲与区域
    北美洲
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    北京
    人物
    毛泽东
    大学
    北京大学
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    人权人士

    一名中国学生在逃到美国以后,变身企业家回到了中国,与自己以前反对的政府做生意–他是沈彤,一位曾表现激进的民运人士,因声称潜回中国从事地下活动在美国媒体上高调一时,亦曾是台湾媒体上的丑闻主角。消息人士对多维社说,他的软件被中国政府用来监视民众。

    美国《财富》杂志小企业版(FORTUNE Small Business Magazine)最近一篇报导(A Tiananmen rebel turns capitalist),对此有较细致的披露:

    这是一名曾为北京政治异议分子的美籍华裔软件开发商;一名曾经参与领导了1989年民主运动的企业家;一位年轻的资本主义者,他现在卖的网络软件,既可以打开中国社会的大门,也可以帮助保持大门关闭。

    中国共产党仍然具有制定和执行公民生活条规的专有权力。但驱动中国惊人的经济增长是像沈彤这样无所顾忌的企业家,而不是政府。

    一旦沈彤离开他位在北京东北面的新科技办公区时,就会有一辆挂着政府车牌的黑色奥迪轿车跟着他。这次,他前往CNN的北京分社,和来到清华的网络软件研究中心作他的产品推销。

    《财 富》杂志小企业版说,现年39岁的沈彤在纽约市经营一家新兴的软件公司-“万视科技”(VFinity)。他的主要产品是一种供大学、广播电视台用的软 件,就像可以用来管理多媒体文件的浏览器和搜索引擎。就像一个图象化Google一样。该软件允许任何用户创造或者编辑图象文件,然后上载至公司服务器或 者网上任何地方,而且,能够让用户轻易的就找到它。

    沈彤指出,简单来说,这个概念就像是电视台里的网路搜寻引擎Google,它可以因为电视台数位化而所有节目内容由类比讯号转换成数位讯号后,再交由万视的软体统一管理。

    1980年代末,沈彤是一名北京大学的生物系学生,他成为当时横扫中国各城市大学的学生运动潮的一分子。

    沈 彤在他1990年的回忆录《几乎是一场革命》(Almost a Revolution)中清晰的记述了这段血腥经历:“数百人冲上大街,组成一堵围墙,但是,就当他们刚进入街中心,一阵机关枪扫射驱散了他们。中弹的人 倒到地上,一动不动。我对自己说,这些人死了。这些子弹是真的。”

    天安门事件之后的几年里,沈彤在世界各地旅行,宣传中国民主运动,与Vaclav Havel和达赖喇嘛等国际名人亲密的交换意见,同时过着罗曼蒂克的快乐生活。

    但 是,到1990年代末时,沈彤把他的注意力从政治转到商业。他于2000年创建万视科技,自那以后,在angel financing中筹资到了1,000多万美元。这间公司有45名雇员,在纽约市、台北和北京都有办公室。公司客户包括Brandeis大学、台湾国立 大学和中国政府的各种部门。

    自然而然,沈彤对他与中国政府之间的合同三缄其口。就台面记录来看,他否认万视科技向中国军方或者其他国家安全部门直接卖软件。但是,沈彤承认,他无法控制谁从零售商那里购买他的产品。

    而 且,万视科技官方网站上把监视业列为众多他们公司希望通过他们公司的看家产品万视科技2.3改变的行业之一。他们的宣传并仅仅以此而已:“每年保安摄像器 都会录制成千上万小时的录像。如何在一个地方存储这些录像,并能够方便的取出这些录像供专业保安人士使用是一大挑战。万视科技可以做到这点。”

    尽 管,你无法否认监视录像记录在执法过程中的重要作用,但是,美国的隐私权拥护组织一直对越来越普遍的摄像监视表示不满。但是,万视科技的宣传文字在一个像 中国这样的警察国家里有了更邪恶的意义。当你考虑到万视科技的创建人曾花费了10多年的时间抵抗中国共产党,而且共产党直到现在还继续跟踪他的一举一动 时,而这些轻快的语言看起来似乎完全是超现实的。

    沈彤和记者曾在电话上,和某天晚上在咖啡厅里讨论过这问题,他指出,尽管万视科技的图象平台加入了先进的面貌分辨技术,他们公司选择从其他开发商那里引进这种能力,而不是自己写这些程序。

    他说:“这是条我们不想越过的界限。”当记者问沈彤,当他直接、甚至间接的向可能把他的产品用作镇压工具的客户卖软件时,是否违背了他的道德原则时,他耸耸肩膀。他说:“我从不怀疑技术既可以用在好的和坏的目的上。电脑和电话也可以被好人和坏人使用。”

    但是,他认为万视科技最终会帮助好人,因为他赋予普通人像专家一样管理媒体的力量。他说:“一个把媒体交给任何人的系统无疑是个解放民主的物品。这是创办这家公司的起始宗旨。”

    《财 富》杂志小企业版说,如果解放中国人民确实是万视科技的企业目标,这公司在中国将面对重重困难。天安门事件18年后,中国仍然是个充斥着官僚主义的警察国 家,政府下达法令,然后用法来维护自己的利益。民众舆论受到严格的监控:近年来,无数中国记者和维权人士因为敢于触及像民主、爱滋和腐败等“敏感”话题被 关入监牢和受到骚扰。

    他说,政府当局容忍了沈彤到北京访问,条件是不涉入中国政治活动。看来沈彤是遵守这一点的。但是当我问,他是否自视为 后政治人物了。沈彤马上打断说:“当然不是。我只是没有再带着任务回来,只是在这个意义上我是后政治人物。我现在是一名观察者。不过假如我是诚实的,我必 须扪心自问,我的所作所为是不是起了变化。”

    沈彤继续对他们这一代人的民主运动活动进行反思,他们之中还在与中国政府对抗的,已经是寥寥无几了。他说:“在我们20多岁的时候,我们认为民主化和反腐败是最重要的事情,而现在最重要的事情,是取得成功,是致富。”

    有 一天晚上我在北京和他的姐姐沈清(Qing Shen,音译)一起吃饭,他姐姐40岁左右,活跃和精灵,是万视科技公司的共同创始人,曾经是北京一本精美的杂志的出版人和生活时尚的专栏作家,有过引 人注目的职业经历。在北京工人体育馆附近一家令人惬意和布满书籍的泰国风味餐馆里,记者向沈清提问说,为什么她认为她弟弟已经远离政治。

    沈 清一板一眼地回答说:“10年了,看不到什么结果,你就会厌倦了。中国还是没有多少民主。” 《财富》杂志小企业版说,那么是什么在推动沈彤前进呢?是雄心壮志吗,只能说它是部分原因。也许他不是渴望集聚个人财富,而是显然要使万视科技公司在市场 上取得成功。他也像那些最有魅力的领袖人物一样,知道如何雄心勃勃地推动一场更广泛的运动,那就是推动中国的民主或者是数字化媒体革命。但是,沈彤也相信 由用户控制的所谓web2.0媒体技术能够释放出人的潜力。

    他乐于向那些想知道有关信息的“专家分类”(taxonomy)与“民众分类”(folksonomy)之间区别的用户、记者和其他人侃侃而谈。

    杜 威十进图书分类系统(Dewey Decimal System)是一种传统的经典分类方法,目前在全球图书馆系统广泛使用,它们属于“专家分类”法,而YouTube和维基百科(Wikipedia)都 属于“民众分类”法或“草根分类”法,后者是在指,任何用户都有权去添加、组织和注释媒体的内容,无论是文字、照片还是视频,在这个意义上,它是一种用户 全权的分类方式。而万视科技公司提供的软件产品兼具这两种分类系统的长处,它既是前者又是后者,管理员可以对系统中的每个内容作出定义,而任何其他的授权 用户也都可以将自己的描述添加上系统中去。

    《财富》杂志小企业版说,是否“民众分类”解放了人呢?那要取决于用户怎么使用。目前不清楚的 是,谁会从基于这种技术的产品、例如万视科技软件中受益最多?中国政府里的神秘者,毫无疑问,这些人将使用这类软件来监控国内的人民,包括他们的自己人、 学者、维权人士和记者等,而这些人将使用这种软件来挑战政府的版本。

    走过天安门广场时,记者想到了沈彤。天安门广场实际上是一个巨大的方形 空间,南端是放置着供人瞻仰的末代专制者的毛泽东纪念堂;北面是故宫的城楼,原为帝王的宫殿,现在成旅游胜地;西边是人民大会堂,中共在那里举行核心会议 而民众通常被拒之门外。几十名大多是年轻人的便衣警察在警戒线附近站着。到处都是摄像镜头,监视着巨大广场上的中外游人。

    -

    Original Article from Fortune Small Business http://tinyurl.com/2a5zshd

    A Tiananmen rebel turns capitalist

    After fleeing to the U.S., an entrepreneur returns to do business with his former oppressors.

    By Richard McGill Murphy, FSB Magazine

    First Published: April 17, 2007: 5:58 AM EDT
    shen_tong.03.jpg
    Tong, in front of the Great Helmsman’s jacket, during a business trip to Beijing.
    CHINA INC.

    The perils of doing business in the Middle Kingdom More small U.S. enterprises have been entering China in recent years, attracted by low-wage manufacturing and a middle-class consumer population of more than 100 million.
    China is not an easy place in which to operate. Corruption is rampant: One Beijing-based U.S. businessman budgets $20,000 a year to bribe officials. The average bribe is $250, often payable in retail gift cards.
    The bureaucracy can be dauntingly complex. “The government isn’t just one Sauron,” says a U.S. entrepreneur who has had his share of run-ins with Chinese officials. “It’s more like a lot of orcs.” One U.S.-backed Chinese travel website, Qunar (qunar.com), faced state wrath in January when it ran an aggressive ad comparing its lower fares with those of a politically connected Chinese-owned competitor. Although it wasn’t clear that the ad was illegal, officials forced Qunar’s marketing officer to apologize at a press conference.
    The American Chamber of Commerce in China site (amcham-china.org.cn) has more on local business conditions.
    (FSB Magazine) — I’m standing in an elevator on the ground floor of the Information Science and Technology building at Tsinghua University in Beijing. It’s a cold, sunny morning. A stiff breeze has banished the city’s habitual blanket of brownish-gray smog, and the air outside is crystalline. I start to introduce my translator to Shen Tong, an American entrepreneur, and his team of Chinese engineers and sales representatives. But Tong shakes his head sharply, and I fall silent. We are not alone.

    What kind of U.S. entrepreneur gets followed around Beijing by agents from the Public Security Bureau, China’s version of the FBI? Answer: A Chinese-American software developer who was once a political dissident right here in Beijing. An entrepreneur who helped lead the pro-democracy movement that led to the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. A young capitalist who now sells Internet software that could open up Chinese society – or help keep it closed.

    Tong’s story is modern China writ small. The Communist Party still claims the exclusive right to make and enforce the rules by which citizens live. But China’s astonishing economic growth is being driven by freewheeling entrepreneurs such as Tong, not by the government.

    In 1990 the state controlled 83 percent of the Chinese economy. Today about 70 percent of China’s GDP is generated by the private sector, which is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises. Much weighs in the balance. Will the private sector’s growing power eventually make China more democratic (and more open to U.S. exports and investments) or trigger more repression?

    A black Audi Sedan with government plates trails Tong as he makes his way around the Chinese capital from his office in a new technology office park in northeast Beijing. He’s come to make sales calls at CNN’s Beijing bureau and at an Internet software research center here at Tsinghua, an elite technology school often compared to MIT.

    Usually the watchers keep their distance, but this morning one of them actually pushes his way into the elevator with Tong. In the corner of my eye, I see a nondescript man of about 40. He wears a black leather jacket and clutches a cell phone in his right hand. The man stares straight ahead, as if he were minding his own business and not Tong’s.

    Later Tong tells me that he doesn’t usually speak to the watchers. “They would consider it offensive,” he says dryly. “They’re supposed to be undercover.” But the entrepreneur was driven to address his minders on one occasion last year, during a business meeting in the lobby of the China World Hotel in Beijing. Public Security agents commandeered waiter uniforms from the hotel restaurant, he says, so that they could spy on him more discreetly. It didn’t work. Tong recalls, “I walked up to one of [the agents] and said, ‘You look ridiculous. You know that, right?’ And the guy blushed!”

    At 39, Tong runs a New York City software startup, VFinity (vfinity.com). His main product is a browser and search engine that universities, broadcasters and the like can use to manage their multimedia archives. Think video Google (GOOGFortune 500). The software allows anyone who owns, creates or edits a video to tag it and put it on a company server or anywhere on the Internet in a way that makes it easy to find. The company’s biggest market to date has been university libraries.

    A card-carrying member of the international hipoisie, Tong lives in downtown Manhattan, favors black clothing and collects Chinese contemporary art with an aesthete’s devotion and a businessman’s keen eye for future appreciation. During his one free afternoon on a recent business trip to Beijing, he sauntered through a series of galleries in Beijing’s über-trendy Dashanzi (“798″) district, an industrial area near the airport that has been transformed in recent years by an influx of artists, gallery owners and chic cafés.

    Tong bought a pair of paintings, posed for pictures near an outdoor sculpture of an empty Mao suit, and pointed out Chinese graffiti scrawled on one of the old factory walls. “Freedom belongs to the people,” Tong translated for me. “Wow! I’m surprised to see something that bold here. And look underneath: It’s signed ’007′!” Tong laughed. Fifty yards down the street, his personal Agent 007 loiters in the late-afternoon gloom, wearing a short zippered jacket with a fur collar.

    Chinese government concern about Tong dates back to the late 1980s. As a biology student at Beijing University, he became deeply involved in a wave of student activism that was sweeping campuses in Beijing and other cities across China. At the peak of the movement in the spring of 1989, some one million Chinese students, intellectuals and labor activists staged a peaceful occupation of Tiananmen Square in central Beijing, calling for more democracy and less government corruption. During the Tiananmen occupation, Tong ran a movement press office that published an underground newspaper and operated a pirate radio station that broadcast out of his dorm room.

    “He was a poster boy for the student movement: good-looking but also bright and thoughtful,” recalls Jaime FlorCruz, a veteran China watcher who covered Tiananmen for Time magazine and now serves as CNN’s Beijing bureau chief. (Time and CNN, like FSB, are owned by Time Warner.) Tong also participated in efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to the standoff between the student dissidents and the Communist regime led by Premier Li Peng.

    Those negotiations failed. On June 4, People’s Liberation Army tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square. Hundreds, if not thousands, of unarmed Chinese civilians were gunned down in the streets surrounding the square. A much smaller number of police and soldiers were beaten to death by enraged demonstrators after the shooting started.

    Tong evoked the violence vividly in his 1990 memoir, Almost a Revolution: “Hundreds of people rushed into the avenue to put up barricades, but as soon as they reached the middle of the street, a spray of machine-gun fire scattered them. People who had been hit fell to the ground and lay still. Those people are dead, I thought to myself. The bullets are real.”

    A ‘charmed life’

    The police came looking for Tong at his college dormitory and at his family’s house in Beijing. He went into hiding when the shooting started and fled China a few days later. He made his way to the U.S., took a biology degree from Brandeis, and pursued graduate studies in political philosophy and sociology at Boston University, living on scholarship, consulting and freelance-writing income. He also launched a nonprofit called the Democracy for China Fund, dedicated to supporting dissident networks in China.

    For a few years after Tiananmen, Tong traveled the world, speaking about the Chinese democracy movement, hobnobbing with international icons such as Vaclav Havel and the Dalai Lama, and generally leading the charmed life of a romantic young dissident who had played a prominent role in perhaps the most dramatic popular uprising of modern times.

    “What he did was courageous, but also prudent in a long-term way,” said the distinguished political philosopher Harvey Mansfield, a Harvard professor who mentored Tong during his graduate-school days. “He wasn’t just angry for the moment. He also had big plans, and I think still has big plans for a democratic China. We have to hope that they come true.”

    But by the late 1990s, Tong had turned his attention decisively from politics to commerce. He founded VFinity in 2000 and has since raised more than $10 million in angel financing. The closely held company has 45 employees and maintains offices in New York City, Taipei and Beijing. Clients include Brandeis University, Taiwan’s National University and various branches of the Chinese government.

    Tong is understandably reticent about his government contracting work in China. For the record, he denies that VFinity sells software to the Chinese military or other state security agencies. But Tong admits that he can’t control who buys his products through local resellers.

    Good and bad technology

    And VFinity’s Web site lists surveillance as one of the many industries that the company hopes to transform via VFinity 2.3, its flagship product. The marketing pitch continues: “Hundreds of thousands of hours of video are captured by security cameras every year. The challenge is to store this video in one place and make it intelligently retrievable for quick and accurate use by security professionals. VFinity meets this challenge.”

    Privacy advocates in the U.S. have long expressed discomfort with the increasing ubiquity of video surveillance, although you’d have to be the Unabomber to deny that video has a useful role to play in law enforcement. But VFinity’s marketing literature takes on more sinister connotations in a police state such as China. And the breezy language seems downright surreal when you consider that the founder of VFinity spent more than a decade struggling against China’s communist regime, which continues to track his every movement today.

    Tong and I discussed this question over the phone and late one night in the coffee shop of my hotel, where he insisted on sitting with his back to the wall so that he could keep one eye peeled for his minders. He noted that although VFinity’s video platform incorporates advanced facial-recognition technology, the company had chosen to license that capability from another developer rather than creating it in-house.

    “That’s a line we don’t want to cross,” he said. When I asked Tong whether he was crossing an ethical line by selling his software, even indirectly, to customers who might use it as a tool of repression, he shrugged. “I have no illusion that technology can be used for good and bad purposes,” he said. “Computers and telephones can be used by good guys and bad guys.”

    He argues, however, that VFinity will ultimately help the good guys, because it puts the power to manage media into the hands of ordinary users as well as experts. “There’s no doubt that a system designed to put media into anyone’s hands is liberating,” he says. “That was the starting point for founding this company.”

    Leaving political life

    If liberation is indeed VFinity’s corporate goal, the company has its work cut out for it in China. Eighteen years after Tiananmen, China remains a bureaucratic police state whose government passes laws and then interprets them to suit itself. Public speech is tightly controlled: Numerous Chinese journalists and activists have been jailed and harassed in recent years for daring to broach “sensitive” topics such as democracy, which remains a mostly abstract concept, HIV/AIDS (all too real) and official corruption, which permeates society.

    The Keystone Kops who follow Tong around Beijing represent a state security apparatus that struggles to monitor public gatherings, phone communications and every online keystroke by China’s 137 million Internet users, who are discouraged from accessing subversive content by a vast state filtering system known as the Great Firewall of China.

    The government tolerates Tong’s visits to Beijing, he says, on condition that he stay out of Chinese politics. He seems to keep his side of the bargain. But Tong shook his head when I asked whether he considered himself post-political. “Of course not,” he snapped. “I’m post-political only in the sense that I’m not coming back on a mission. I’m observing. [But] if I’m being honest, I have to ask if I’m making a difference.”

    Tong went on to muse about his generation of activists, few of whom are still confronting the Chinese government. “In our 20s we thought that democratization and ending corruption were the most important things,” he said. “Now the most important things are succeeding and becoming affluent.”

    Those who know Tong best, however, agree that he isn’t particularly motivated by money. I dined in Beijing one night with his older sister Qing Shen, a lively, elfin woman of about 40 who co-founded VFinity and has had a high-profile career as a glossy-magazine publisher and lifestyle columnist in Beijing. Over Thai food in a cozy, book-lined restaurant near Workers Stadium, I asked Qing why she thought her brother had left political life. “After ten years you get tired of not seeing results,” she replied matter-of-factly. “There’s still not much democracy in China.”

    Taxonomy v. folksonomy

    So what makes Tong run? Ambition, partly. While he may not hunger for personal wealth, he clearly wants VFinity to succeed in the marketplace. And like most charismatic leaders, he knows how to harness his own ambition to the power of a broader movement, be it Chinese democracy or the digital media revolution. But I think Tong also believes his rhetoric about the liberating potential of user-controlled, so-called Web 2.0 media technology.

    He loves to lecture customers, journalists and anyone else who will listen about the distinction between “taxonomy,” a system of classification in which experts provide all the descriptive information, and “folksonomy,” a system in which ordinary users make up their own descriptions on the fly. The Dewey Decimal System is a classic taxonomy, still used in libraries worldwide. Web 2.0 services such as YouTube and Wikipedia are folksonomies in the sense that any user has the power to add, organize and annotate the media content, be it text, photographs or videoclips. VFinity is both taxonomy and folksonomy: The administrator can define rules of description for every piece of content on the system, but any authorized user can also add his own descriptive fields.

    Is folksonomy liberating? That depends on how it’s used. And it remains unclear who stands to benefit more from folksonomy-based technology such as VFinity: Chinese government spooks, who will undoubtedly use it to spy on their own people, or scholars, activists, and journalists, who could use it to challenge the government’s version of reality.

    I thought about Tong as I walked through Tiananmen Square the other day. The square is actually a giant rectangle, bounded on the south by Mao Zedong’s mausoleum, where the late dictator lies embalmed in a glass case for all to see. It’s flanked on the north by the walls of the Forbidden City, once home to Chinese emperors and now a tourist attraction, and on the west by the Great Hall of the People, where the Communist Party holds conclaves from which ordinary citizens are normally excluded. Dozens of plainclothes security personnel, mostly quite young, stood around the perimeter. Surveillance cameras were everywhere, scanning the crowds of foreign and Chinese tourists who drifted through the vast, echoing space.


    流亡

    1993/11/05

    流亡

    -

    希望的前日,希望的今天

    流亡的暗夜、流亡的海

    -

    如闪电劃過黑暗,嘎然而止,沒有雷聲

    亡命之旅獨唱滄海桑田的歌

    -

     一个真空伸展着

    把旧的梦幻揉搓开

    又 – - -

    散落了

    -

    探听歌声的粗糙

    大风呼啸

    雁群掠过

       夕阳尽了

    放歌正是清脆的时候

    -

     

    正是清脆的时候

    潮湿的失落

    是咸的

    是浪峰的流光

    幻想拥挤着

    拥挤着引吭的异峰突起

    -

    月色慘淡

    一跳一跳地滚动

    滚动

        滚动

    研碎了一夜之間已经风化的等待

    -

    我爱啊

    歌声拨开泪水的珠帘

    将尽酒  手中的冰凉

    近乎温润了

    微笑挂在泪滴上

    和陨星一道

    在云的前后  悄然地

    流盼

    -

     

    天朦朦亮

    流亡開始


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